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I. INTRODUCTION

In the growing cacophony of voices heralding or contesting the
many facets of globalization, international organizations (“IOs”) are
playing an increasingly prominent role.
Government officials,
advocacy groups, and scholars are heatedly contesting the merits and
demerits of using IOs to promote interstate cooperation and to resolve
the many transborder collective action problems that globalization has
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fostered. These controversies raise important questions about how
IOs are designed and how they respond to the uncertainties and
changing circumstances that are endemic to international affairs.
In the debates over globalization and institutional change, one
IO—the International Labor Organization (“ILO”)—has been given
surprisingly short shrift.1 Founded in 1919 and headquartered in
Geneva, Switzerland, the ILO is one of the world’s oldest IOs. It has
survived a world war and a cold war, a major global depression and a
slew of recessions, a quadrupling in the number of its member states,
and the rise of global capitalism.2
The ILO has a unique tripartite governance structure.
Representatives of governments, organized labor, and employers from
each of the organization’s 178 member states participate in the work
of the ILO in a ratio of 2-1-1, respectively. Worker and employer
delegates attend the annual ILO Conference, the organization’s
principal lawmaking body, and meetings of its executive arm, the
Governing Body, in their independent capacities. They form separate
caucuses and often vote with their respective groups rather than with
their governments.3 With only minor modifications, this “corporatist”
tripartite structure has survived intact as the ILO’s membership has
grown from a small club of Western European states to include
members with radically different approaches to managing labor
relations, including the United States, socialist nations, and a large
contingent of countries from the developing world.4
1.
In this Article, I use the Americanized spelling of the ILO’s name, but retain the
original Anglicized spelling where it appears in official ILO documents and secondary sources.
2.
See generally ANTONY ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
(1971); DAVID A. MORSE, 1 THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE I.L.O. AND ITS ROLE IN THE
WORLD COMMUNITY (1969); THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (James T.
Shotwell ed., 1934).
3.
The ILO Constitution directs each member state to appoint two government delegates,
one worker delegate, and one employer delegate. Constitution of the International Labour
Organization art. 389.1, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, 225 C.T.I.A. 373 [hereinafter 1919 ILO
Constitution]. The constitution directs governments to appoint worker and employer delegates
“in agreement with the industrial organizations . . . which are most representative of employers
or workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective countries.” Id. art. 389.3. For discussions of
the ILO’s structure and the importance of tripartism to the organization’s work, see N. VALTICOS
& G. VON POTOBSKY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 40–42 (1995); C. Wilfred Jenks, The
Significance for International Law of the Tripartite Character of the International Labour
Organisation, in 22 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 45, 45–58 (1936); David Strang &
Patricia Mei Yin Chang, The International Labor Organization and the Welfare State:
Institutional Effects on National Welfare Spending 1960-80, 47 INT’L ORG. 235, 241 (1993).
4.
Robert W. Cox, Labor and Hegemony, 31 INT’L ORG. 385, 386–88, 409–10 (1977)
[hereinafter Cox, Labor and Hegemony]. See generally Lucio Baccaro, What Is Dead and What Is
Alive in the Theory of Corporatism (Decent Work Research Programme Discussion Paper No.
DP/143/2002, Int’l Inst. Lab. Stud., 2002) (describing the different meanings of corporatism),
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp14302.pdf.
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Given this tenacious capacity for survival and the central
importance of labor rules to both economic development and trade, the
ILO should occupy a pivotal, even preeminent, place in the debates
over the role of IOs in globalization. Remarkably, this is not the case.
According to one recent study, “most reasonably informed people have
little idea what the letters I-L-O stand for,” and even trade specialists
and labor economists have failed to pay much attention to the
organization and the lessons its survival may offer.5 This is a far cry
from the widespread attention given to other IOs—such as the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) and the World Bank—which stand at the
center of globalization’s maelstrom and which have prompted both
street protests and reams of academic commentary.
A principal reason for the ILO’s inconspicuous profile is a
widely held perception that the organization is powerless to combat
the workplace abuses that globalization can engender, abuses that
include “child labor, punishingly long work days, harsh discipline,
hazardous working conditions, sexual predation, and suppression of
the freedom to associate and organize.”6 Numerous studies deride the
ILO as a “90-pound weakling of UN agencies,” a “toothless tiger,”7
whose only tools of influence are the sunshine of public scrutiny and
the shame of public censure,8 and whose feeble enforcement
mechanisms render all but nugatory its efforts to improve global labor
conditions.9

5.
KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE
UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 93 (2003).
6.
Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous
Improvement in the Global Workplace, at 4 (May 2, 2000), available at http://www.archonfung.
net/papers/RLS21.pdf.
7.
ELLIOTT & FREEMAN, supra note 5, at 95, 102.
8.
See Edward Weisband, Discursive Multilateralism: Global Benchmarks, Shame, and
Learning in the ILO Labor Standards Monitoring Regime, 44 INT’L STUD. Q. 643, 648 (2000); see
also Michael J. Trebilcock & Rob Howse, Trade Policy and Labor Standards, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 261, 274 (2005) (“[C]ompliance with ILO norms depends on a combination of public
identification, embarrassment and shaming (a mild stick), and technical assistance to promote
compliance (a mild carrot).”).
9.
See, e.g., Sean Cooney, Testing Times for the ILO: Institutional Reform for the New
International Political Economy, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 365, 399 (1999) (stating that the
ILO is “[v]iewed by many as a ‘slow, cumbersome and low-profile institution’ . . . [that] has not
made the impact it should in the new political economy”) (internal citation omitted); William A.
Douglas et al., An Effective Confluence of Forces in Support of Workers’ Rights: ILO Standards,
US Trade Laws, Unions, and NGOs, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 273, 276 (2004) (noting “frequent
allegations that the ILO ‘has no teeth,’ and that its work consequently makes little difference in
the labor practices of governments”) (citation omitted); Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8, at 274
(“The ILO has been widely criticized by proponents of a trade/labor linkage for ineffective
enforcement of its norms . . . .”).
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These critiques of the ILO’s efficacy cannot be attributed to
institutional inertia. Over the course of its long history, the ILO has
adopted no fewer than 185 conventions and a similar number of
recommendations. These instruments range from basic human rights
charters to detailed regulatory codes for specific industries. Unlike
domestic lawmaking bodies, whose rules apply automatically once
adopted, the legislative output of the ILO—like that of all other IOs—
is subject to an additional political filter. Each member state must
separately ratify each convention adopted by the ILO before that
treaty can legally bind that state.
This political filter has led the ILO to adopt many treaties that
are sparsely ratified. The gap between treaty adoption and treaty
ratification has increased over time. In fact, with the exception of a
few “core labor standards” agreements, ratification rates have actually
declined.10 Recent econometric studies challenge the ILO’s efficacy at
a deeper level. They contest the organization’s claim that ratified
treaties influence domestic labor practices, arguing instead that
countries only sign on to conventions whose obligations are already
reflected in their national laws.11
The ILO was not always held in such low esteem. The
organization received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1969 for its “lasting
influence on the legislation of all countries.”12 Within the academy,
the ILO was an object of attention and lavish praise by international
legal scholars and political scientists alike. Commentators penned
detailed and laudatory analyses of the ILO’s treaty-making and
treaty-monitoring functions, the influence of ILO officials, its
tripartite structure, and its capacity to adapt to changes in its
political, economic, and legal environment.13
10. See Int’l Lab. Office, Committee on Legal Issues and International Labour Standards,
Possible Improvements in the Standard-Setting Activities of the ILO: Addendum: Statistics on the
Ratification of Conventions, GB.277/LILS/2(Add.1), 277th Sess. (Geneva Mar. 2000), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb277/pdf/lils-2a1.pdf [hereinafter ILO,
Statistics on Ratification]; Bernhard Boockmann, The Ratification of ILO Conventions: A Hazard
Rate Analysis, 13 ECON. & POL. 281, 294 (2001).
11. See Robert J. Flanagan, Labor Standards and International Competitive Advantage, in
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS 15, 20, 29 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds.,
2003).
12. Steve Charnovitz, Promoting Higher Labor Standards, 18 WASH. Q., Summer 1995, at
167, 173 (1995).
13. For the most influential political science accounts, see Special Issue, The International
Labor Organization, 166 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (1933) [hereinafter ANNALS ILO
ISSUE]; Robert W. Cox, ILO: Limited Monarchy, in THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION
MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 102 (Robert W. Cox & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1974)
[hereinafter Cox, Limited Monarchy]; ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE:
FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1964); E. A. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS OF I.L.O. EXPERIENCE (1966) [hereinafter LANDY,
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How, then, did the ILO fall so far from grace? In part, because
of the unintended consequences of decisions made by the individuals
running the organization, in particular its Directors General and its
permanent Secretariat—known as the ILO Office.14 Shortly after the
organization’s founding at the end of the First World War, the first
Director General, Albert Thomas, skillfully exploited ambiguities in
the ILO Constitution and forged connections to national trade unions
to increase the power and influence of ILO officials. The Director
General expanded the Office’s information gathering, standard
setting, and treaty monitoring functions, enhancing its authority and
effectiveness. These innovations enabled the ILO to survive the
Second World War and to forge a relationship with the newly created
United Nations.
The ILO’s evolution during the post-war period was very
different, however. Seeking to place the organization at the forefront
of social and economic regulation, the ILO expanded its mandate to
encompass new subject areas and modified preexisting lawmaking and
monitoring procedures to match these new tasks. These adaptations
responded to both external pressures (including changes in the
economic and political landscape and demands from a larger and more
diverse membership) and internal initiatives (from the Directors
General and ILO officials) to push the organization in new
directions.15 For reasons I explain in greater detail below, these
adaptive efforts were mostly unsuccessful, leading to a period of
institutional stagnation during which the ILO became increasingly
dysfunctional and ineffective.
Over the last decade, however, the ILO has entered a new
phase of innovation, one that has involved narrowing its mandate to
emphasize universal compliance with a core group of fundamental
labor rights. This restructuring began with a period of self-critical
analysis in which the organization, again led by the Director General
and the Office, sought to learn from other IOs and from its own past
mistakes. The ILO has since adopted novel approaches to treatymaking and treaty monitoring that are intended to streamline its
activities, enhance its effectiveness, and reach out to new
THIRTY YEARS]. For influential accounts by international legal scholars, some of them former
ILO officials, see ALCOCK, supra note 2; C. WILFRED JENKS, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LAW OF
NATIONS: THE ILO IMPACT AFTER FIFTY YEARS (1970) [hereinafter JENKS, ILO IMPACT]; MORSE,
supra note 2.
14. The International Labor Office is the ILO’s permanent secretariat. The Office is headed
by the Director General, who is appointed by the Governing Body, the ILO’s executive arm. See
VALTICOS & VON POTOBSKY, supra note 3, at 42.
15. For a discussion of the distinction between exogenous and endogenous sources of change
within IOs, see infra note 43.
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constituencies beyond the organized labor groups that have
traditionally been its supporters.
In this Article, I trace the ILO’s past and its present with two
broad objectives in mind. First, I offer a corrective to the prevailing
view among international lawyers and legal scholars that the ILO is a
weak and ineffective institution, one that has “been around forever,
but . . . also has done nothing forever, so . . . is not terribly
interesting.”16 Even a cursory review of the organization’s activities
reveals the fallacy of this statement. The ILO has not, however, been
equally active or equally effective in influencing state behavior
throughout its history. A study of law-related innovation in the ILO
thus offers important insights for legal scholars and government
officials who seek to enhance the efficacy of other IOs.
Second, this Article’s process-tracing history of the ILO serves
an important theoretical purpose—to analyze the under-studied issue
of how IOs change. As world events have revealed the central role
that IOs play in promoting interstate cooperation, scholars of
international affairs have developed competing theories to explain
why states create IOs and why IOs appear in different forms.17 But
how IOs evolve after their founding is an under-theorized issue that
commentators are only now beginning to consider.18 This omission is
all the more consequential given disparities in IO longevity. As a
recent empirical study concludes, IOs “do have a mortality rate, and it
can be surprisingly high.”19 But the evidence also reveals a strong
survivor bias: the more years that have elapsed since an IO was
founded, the longer it is likely to exist.20 This makes the ILO—at
nearly ninety, one of the world’s oldest IOs—a particularly fruitful
venue in which to analyze theories of institutional change.

16. The Challenge of Non-State Actors, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 20, 35 (1998) (reprinting
the statement of Jessica Tuchman Mathews, President of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace).
17. See, e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 17–45
(2005); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7–10 (2005);
THE RATIONAL DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (Koremenos et al. eds., 2004); HENRY G.
SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN
DIVERSITY (4th ed. 2004); Beth A. Simmons & Lisa L. Martin, International Organizations and
Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 192 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds.,
2002). For earlier influential contributions, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States
Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 8 (1998); Stephan
Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT’L ORG. 491 (1987).
18. For a discussion of the few commentators that have addressed these issues, see infra
Part II.
19. Cheryl Shanks et al., Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International
Governmental Organizations, 1981–1992, 50 INT’L ORG. 593, 594 (1996).
20. Id. at 621–22.
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Three social science theories attempt to explain the mechanics
of change in IOs: (1) rational choice; (2) neofunctionalism; and (3)
historical institutionalism.21 Each theory offers a different prediction
as to the actors that establish IOs, the goals of those actors, and the
mechanisms they adopt to achieve their goals. More intriguingly, each
theory predicts that IOs will follow a different evolutionary path
whose trajectory is marked by changes in their external environments,
by shifts in state preferences, by the independent efforts of private
parties and IO officials, or by a combination of these factors.
A historical study of the ILO provides two opportunities to
evaluate these competing theoretical frameworks and, in addition, to
consider the under-examined role of IO officials in promoting
institutional change. First, the four major phases of the ILO’s
existence—its founding, the interwar years, the decades following
World War II, and post-Cold War globalization—offer discrete
domains within which to assess the theories’ comparative explanatory
power. As I discuss below, no single theory explains the changes that
occurred in each episode of the ILO’s life cycle.22 The influence of the
ILO’s past on the organization’s current reforms provides a second
opportunity for theoretical assessment. As this Article will show, none
of the theories would have expected ILO officials to revitalize the
organization, seventy-five years after its birth, by contracting its
authority rather than expanding it.
Before proceeding with these arguments, a cautionary note is
in order. This Article does not seek to analyze every aspect of the
ILO.23 Rather, I limit my focus to the creation of international labor
standards and how the organization determines whether member
states are adhering to those standards. I refer to these two activities
as, respectively, ILO “lawmaking” and ILO “monitoring.”24
Lawmaking and monitoring are among the most important tasks that

21. See infra Part II (analyzing these theories and their variants in greater depth).
22. Cf. Peter J. Katzenstein & Nobuo Okawara, Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case
of Analytical Eclecticism, 26 INT’L SECURITY 153, 154 (2001) (arguing “against the privileging of
parsimony that has become the hallmark of paradigmatic debates” and in favor of “drawing
selectively on different [theoretical] paradigms”).
23. ILO activities not analyzed in this Article include technical assistance, educational
activities, and the gathering and dissemination of cross-national labor statistics. See Strang &
Chang, supra note 3, at 241.
24. “Lawmaking” includes the procedures by which an IO creates and revises legally
binding treaty commitments and nonbinding recommendations. “Monitoring” focuses on
implementation and compliance. It includes procedures for determining whether an IO’s member
nations are adhering to the organization’s rules and norms and how the IO responds to the
compliance information that it discovers. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 17, at 22–23, 26–27.
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an IO performs.25 I analyze how the ILO’s founders envisioned that
these activities would occur, and then consider how the two tasks
evolved in response to changes in the organization’s external
environment, to the varying composition and shifting demands of
governments, workers, and employers, and, perhaps most
surprisingly, to the independent efforts of the ILO Directors General
and the ILO Office.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II
reviews three social science theories of IOs and analyzes the
important but understudied issue of IO change. Part III begins by
developing a rational choice framework for international labor
standards and evaluating the degree to which that framework is
embodied in the ILO Constitution. Part III then reviews the history of
the ILO, dividing the analysis into discrete time periods that conform
to distinct phases of the organization’s evolution. Part IV analyzes the
lawmaking and monitoring innovations that the ILO has adopted over
the past decade, demonstrating the ways in which the organization
has learned from other IOs and from its own past mistakes. Part V
concludes with a review of the ILO’s legal innovations and a
counterfactual analysis of the three theories of IO change in light of
the evidence presented.
II. THEORIES OF CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Nation states frequently turn to IOs to address the myriad
collective action problems that transcend national borders.26 For more
than two decades, political scientists have sought to understand why
states create IOs and why they select particular design features from
the rich matrix of available alternatives.27 Scholars have advanced
three major theories to answer these questions: (1) rational choice; (2)
25. See generally ALVAREZ, supra note 17, at 273–584 (reviewing multilateral treatymaking and dispute settlement by IOs). This assumes, of course, that the IO founders have
delegated lawmaking and monitoring responsibilities to the organization. Not all IOs possess
such delegated powers.
26. See Charlotte Ku, Global Governance and the Changing Face of International Law, 2
ACUNS REP. & PAPERS 5, 24 (2001) (“A census of international institutions tells us that at the
end of the 20th century there are more than 250 conventional international governmental
organizations . . . [,] more than 1500 other international bodies[,] and roughly 3700 other
institutions of special types, making a total of almost 5500.”) (internal citations omitted); see also
ALVAREZ, supra note 17, at 4–17 (reviewing different definitions of IOs).
27. Serious study of cooperation via IOs and international regimes is generally traced to the
publication of works by Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Stephen D.
Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
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neofunctionalism; and (3) historical institutionalism.28 These three
theories are partly grounded in different strands of international
relations scholarship.29 But they are also central to theoretical
approaches in social science (including sociological, resource
dependence, and organization theories) that analyze the workings of
domestic institutions or that study why similarly situated countries
choose different institutions to address analogous problems.30
These social science theories of institutions have made
significant progress in explaining why nation states turn to IOs to
help them establish and maintain cooperative relationships. As
Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman have recently written: “We know a
lot about the conditions under which states establish IOs, why states
will design them the way they do, and some of the conditions under
which states will grant autonomy to IOs.”31 But for most scholars, the
story of IOs ends where it ought to begin—with their founding. What
these institutions do once they have been created remains underexamined and under-theorized.
This omission is a significant and consequential gap in our
understanding of international institutions. Most IOs possess at least
a modicum of autonomy; many are given substantial independence as
a deliberate strategy to hold states fast to their cooperative
commitments or to confer greater legitimacy upon the subsequent
actions states take through them. Yet this autonomy, whether great
or small, creates opportunities for IOs (or, to be more precise, for the
28. I include within historical institutionalism a family of related theories that includes
sociological institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism and organization theory. (A
fourth variant, rational choice institutionalism, is more easily subsumed under a discussion of
rational choice theory.) These variants of historical institutionalism share a basic premise—that
political action is shaped and constrained by historically constructed institutions that exhibit
surprising durability notwithstanding changes in their economic or political environment or
shifts in the preferences of actors. For a more detailed discussion of the different variants of
historical institutionalism, see Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the
Three Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936 (1996).
29. For an analysis of the intersection between constructivism, rational choice, and
historical institutionalism, see Thomas Risse, Constructivism and International Institutions:
Toward Conversations Across Paradigms, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE
597, 604–07 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) [hereinafter STATE OF THE
DISCIPLINE].
30. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (James Mahoney
& Dietrich Rueschemeyer eds., 2003); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); JOHN W. MEYER & W. RICHARD SCOTT,
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RATIONALITY (1983); J.T. Hage, Organizational
Innovation and Organizational Change, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 597 (1999); Paul Pierson & Theda
Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science, in STATE OF THE
DISCIPLINE, supra note 29, at 693.
31. Michael Barnett & Liv Coleman, Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in
International Organizations, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 593, 593–94 (2005).
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autonomous actors operating within them) to develop preferences and
goals that diverge from those of their founders. As IO autonomy
increases, so too do opportunities to change an IO’s structures,
mandates, and norms.
If little is known about how IOs behave after they have been
created, the causes of change in IOs are even less well understood.
The issues to be addressed include such foundational questions as
who or what catalyzes such formal or informal change of/in IOs and how is a consensus
on the direction of change attained (if at all)? Is this fundamentally driven by principals
in a response to changes in rational interests or shifting domestic/global norms? Or do
IOs, as bureaucratic actors, strategically initiate specific reforms in anticipation of
challenges in their external environments? . . . [W]hat enables or constrains principals
and/or IOs themselves from changing the formal and/or informal rules that drive
organizational actions?32

These questions reveal the wide expanse of theoretical and
empirical terrain yet to be traversed. However, by looking beyond the
specific topic of IOs to social science literature on institutional change
more generally, it is possible to identify hypotheses about IO change
that build upon the foundations of different theoretical traditions.
In the next sections, I undertake this analysis for rational
choice, neofunctionalism, and historical institutionalism. I identify
the actors who found IOs, the goals of those actors, the mechanisms
used to achieve those goals, the nature of change each theory predicts
after an IO’s founding, the responses to those changes, and the
expected outcomes. A table at the end of these sections summarizes
the key points of this analysis and the strengths and weaknesses of
each theoretical framework.

32. Michael Tierney & Catherine Weaver, Principles and Principals? The Possibilities for
Theoretical Synthesis and Scientific Progress in the Study of International Organizations 12–13
(2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citations omitted); see also Barnett &
Coleman, supra note 31, at 594 (“[W]e know relatively little about how, why, and when change
will occur.”).

660

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:3:649

A. Rational Choice and Exogenous Institutional Change
Rational choice provides a compelling explanation of why IOs
exist and why they appear in particular forms. For rational choice
scholars, IOs are creatures of nation states. States call IOs into being;
states select their design features; states control their funding and
other forms of support; and states revise their mandates or even
abolish them when national interests change.33
Self-interested, strategic behavior provides rational choice’s
driving force. States establish IOs to overcome the limitations of their
anarchic environment and to create joint gains that they could not
achieve acting on their own.34 These gains include increasing the
quality and quantity of information, reducing the costs of negotiating
agreements and of linking discrete issue areas, resolving disputes over
the meaning of rules and norms, monitoring behavior, and imposing
sanctions for noncompliance.35
Different strands of rational choice theory offer different
answers to how, if at all, institutions evolve in response to changes in
state preferences. The most straightforward (and the most simplistic)
approach imputes preferences to states from the “strategic
situations”36 or collective action problems that they face. Rather than
examining an IO’s history or the goals of its founders, scholars
adopting this approach take an analytical shortcut. They use the
functions that an institution now performs (or rationally should
perform) to infer current state preferences.37 This assumes that
preferences are well-defined and that there is a close if not perfect
match between preferences and institutional design features.
This approach also predicts that states tightly control the
autonomy they delegate to IOs. When organizations veer from their
prescribed mandates, states quickly respond with corrective action.38
33. See ALVAREZ, supra note 17, at 25; GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 17, at 4–5; see
also Kenneth W. Abbott, “Trust But Verify”: The Production of Information in Arms Control
Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 1 n.3 (1993)
(“[R]ationalist theory often assumes that states act as unitary entities.”).
34. See KEOHANE, supra note 27, at 85–109 (developing a functional theory of international
regimes).
35. Id. at 85–109; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 17, at 8.
36. See Abbott, supra note 33, at 1–2 n.4 (defining a “strategic situation” as “involving a
relationship of interdependence among a relatively small number of actors. When states . . . are
involved in a strategic interaction, each state’s actions affect the fortunes of others as well its
own, and the best course of action depends on what others may do.”).
37. PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 108
(2004).
38. See Darren Hawkins et al., States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent
Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1, 27–37 (Darren
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Perhaps most importantly, this rationalist vision of IOs sees both
state preferences and institutions as essentially static. Because
change is inconsistent with the theory’s premises, it is simply assumed
away.39
Not all rational choice theories adopt such a denatured, timeinsensitive analysis.
Some accounts anticipate changes in the
distribution of power or resources among states or in the geostrategic
context in which they interact.40 Others consider the behavior of
government agencies and non-state actors.41 And still others pay
attention to the messiness and complexity of institutional origins and
to the costs of creating new institutions or modifying old ones.42
Considering any of these factors opens up opportunities for analyzing
how institutions change.
The change that these more capacious rational choice
approaches predict has very specific characteristics, however. Most
fundamentally, change is exogenous to the institution and occurs as a
result of shifts in state preferences.43 Such preference shifts often
Hawkins et al. eds., forthcoming 2006), available at http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlake/Delegation
%20volume.htm.
39. See Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast, Intersections Between Historical and Rational
Choice Institutionalism, in PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS: POINTS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN
HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 7 (Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast
eds., 2005).
40. See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 359–60 (2002).
41. See Christopher A. Whytock, A Rational Design Theory of Transgovernmentalism: The
Case of E.U.-U.S. Merger Review Cooperation, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 12–30 (2005).
42. Katznelson & Weingast, supra note 39, at 5–8 (discussing rational choice variant of
historical institutionalism).
43. Distinguishing between exogenous and endogenous sources of change in the study of
institutions is a difficult and unsettled issue. See Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope:
Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions, 6 J. THEORETICAL POL. 449, 456 (1994) (“The
normal distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables is . . . awkward for institutional
analysis.”); Avner Greif & David D. Laitin, A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, 98 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 633, 633 (2004) (“Endogenous institutional change appears . . . to be a
contradiction in terms.”). This is particularly true for an intergovernmental organization such as
the ILO, whose membership is composed not only of governments but also of autonomous groups
of workers and employers. However, most scholars analyzing IO change appear to agree—albeit
using different labels at times—that change emanating from IO officials and staff is properly
labeled as “endogenous,” whereas that change resulting from shifts in state preferences or from
alterations to the economic, political, or social environment is appropriately described as
“exogenous.” See Barnett & Coleman, supra note 31, at 594 (“The dominant view is that external
forces in general and states in particular are responsible for its timing, direction, and
content. . . . Yet if IOs can take on a life of their own, then they can be agents of change.”); see
also Tierney & Weaver, supra note 32, at 10 (“[S]cholars of IO are waking up to [the] reality . . .
that IOs . . . exhibit varying degrees of autonomy and consequently possess their own preferences
and bureaucratic cultures that are distinct from those of their member states.”). I adopt these
definitions of exogenous and endogenous here, but recognize that alternative labels are possible
and that a more extended treatment of these issues is warranted. See Simon Hug, Endogenous
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follow large and sudden transformations in the external environment.
These shocks, disasters, and crises upset settled habits, alter the
calculus of sunk costs and anticipated benefits, and enable
institutional reforms unobtainable in more settled times.44 In the
comparative politics literature, rational choice scholars account for
such discontinuous institutional changes by searching for “critical
junctures”—key events that usher in distinctively new conditions.45
The result is a model of “punctuated equilibrium,” in which scholars
predict that only rare, sudden, and intense exogenous forces will
herald path-altering institutional change. Outside of these infrequent
and precarious periods, however, institutions are stable or even
static.46
Consistent with its focus on state preferences, this more
nuanced version of rational choice theory predicts specific types of
responses by an IO’s membership. If the cost of closing the gap
between current preferences and preexisting IO structures is too high,
states may abandon an old institution and establish another to
supplant it.47 Or they may stick with an existing IO but consciously
redesign it to fit the new environment.48 As IOs respond to these new
institutional structures, a self-reinforcing equilibrium is achieved,
leading to a fresh period of institutional quiescence in which state
preferences are aligned with IO functions.
The rational choice framework sketched above provides useful
insights for analyzing the forms and functions of IOs and for
predicting states’ responses to exogenous shocks.
However, its
explanation of institutional change is incomplete in at least three
important respects.
Preferences and Delegation in the European Union, 36 COMP. POL. STUD. 41 (2003) (discussing
preference divergences between European Union member states and the supranational actors
they appoint to the European Commission).
44. See Devesh Kapur, Processes of Change in International Organizations 8 (Harvard U.
Weatherhead Ctr., Working Paper No. 00-02, 2000), available at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/
papers/164__Helsinki3.wcfia.pdf; Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of
International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 766–67 (2001).
45. PIERSON, supra note 37, at 51. As I explain below, historical institutionalism also
considers that critical junctures can be important precursors of institutional change. See infra
Part II.C.
46. Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen, Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced
Political Economies, in BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL
ECONOMIES 1, 7.
47. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1583 (2005) (describing
an instance in which states withdrew from a treaty establishing an IO and established a rival
organization).
48. See Koremenos et al., supra note 44, at 766–67 (arguing that “conscious design” is “the
overriding mechanism guiding the development of international institutions” and institutional
change).

2006]

GLOBALIZATION AND INNOVATION IN THE ILO

663

First, rational choice fails to consider that the birth of IOs often
involves political compromises among coalitions of founders with
multiple and often conflicting objectives for establishing a new
institution.49 Second, it gives insufficient attention to government
officials and private parties, whose interests are often distinct from
states or their leaders and who can use IOs to help further those
interests, especially if they possess a formal voice in the organization.
Third and most significantly, the theory fails to adequately consider
the role of IO officials as independent strategic actors who have the
autonomy (if not always the outright authority) to set agendas and
select tasks that chart a course away from an institution’s original
goals.50
Each of these omissions underplays the possibility that change
can occur endogenously, that is, that change can emanate from within
an organization.51
The failure to account for internally-driven
modifications to an organization’s structure, activities, or norms has
recently been noted by rational choice scholars of domestic
institutions.52 One response to this omission—one that is fully
consistent with the theory’s rationalist premise—is to recognize IO
independence as a conscious design feature of certain institutions.53
More autonomy for IO officials and staff brings an increased likelihood
that “IOs can potentially use that autonomy in ways that are not
dictated or delegated by states.”54
This approach resonates with recent principal-agent theories of
IO behavior.55 But it allows only limited conceptual space for IO
independence and for the endogenous changes that such autonomy
can engender. Rather than analyzing these issues, rational choice
scholars emphasize why sovereign states delegate autonomy to IOs in

49. PIERSON, supra note 37, at 108–12.
50. MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 22 (2004) (“IOs must be autonomous actors in some ways
simply to fulfill their delegated tasks.”) (emphasis in original).
51. See supra note 43 (discussing the distinction between endogenous and exogenous
sources of IO change).
52. Barry R. Weingast, Rational-Choice Institutionalism, in STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE,
supra note 29, at 660, 692 (characterizing issues of “endogenous emergence, choice and survival
of institutions” as “frontier issues” for rational choice scholars).
53. Tierney & Weaver, supra note 32, at 10. For a debate over the benefits of independence
in international tribunals, compare Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in
International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005), with Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo,
93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005).
54. Barnett & Coleman, supra note 31, at 595.
55. See Hawkins et al., supra note 38.
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the first instance and how they correct for “agency slack.”56 Such
scholars pay far less attention to the subsequent activities of IOs and
to how states interact with them.57
B. Neofunctionalism and Endogenous Institutional Change
There is, however, an older theoretical tradition—
neofunctionalism—that identifies endogenous actors as the main
engine of IO change. Neofunctionalism was first advanced by political
scientists to explain the sharp increase in the number of global and
regional IOs after the Second World War. According to the theory’s
adherents, IOs arise from the need to address technical and apolitical
transborder issues, such as disease prevention, trade barriers, and
finance.58
States assign IOs the autonomy needed to promote
cooperation in these technocratic, functionally-defined issue areas.
Neofunctionalism shares with rational choice the premise that
actors are self-interested and utility-maximizing. But its disassembly
of states into their constituent parts allows neofunctionalists to model
separately the interests of sub-state actors and IO officials and to
identify how these two groups work in concert to expand the scope of
international cooperation.59
The process of change begins as domestic interest groups
recognize that by working within IOs they can achieve results they
could not obtain in national politics. IO officials, in turn, realize the
benefits of alliances with these groups and actively cultivate their
support. As demands from these sub-state actors increase, officials
promote modest expansions of IO authority that are logical, functional
add-ons to existing tasks and that serve both their own interests and
those of their sub-state clients.60

56. See id. at 7.
57. See Barnett & Coleman, supra note 31, at 595. But see Helfer & Slaughter, supra note
53, at 942–55 (analyzing both exogenous state controls and endogenous cultures of
professionalism that together create a zone of “constrained independence” for international
courts and tribunals).
58. Ernst Haas was the principal proponent of neofunctionalism for both global and
regional organizations. See HAAS, supra note 13; ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE:
POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES, 1950–57 (1958); Ernst Haas, International
Integration: The European and the Universal Process, 15 INT’L ORG. 366 (1961). Haas’s theory of
neofunctionalism was a modification of earlier, functionalist theories of international integration
through IOs. See DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE
FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1944).
59. See Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of
Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 53–57 (1993).
60. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 47–50.
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The institutional change that results from these interactions is
the inverse of that predicted by rational choice models. It is
endogenous, incremental, and continuous, producing small effects at
each individual step but cumulatively resulting in ever deeper levels
of cooperation.61 As support from sub-state actors grows, cooperation
takes on a self-reinforcing dynamic. It spills over from technical,
function issues with low political salience to high-politics issues such
as peace and security, arms control, and human rights.62
The challenge for IO officials is how to promote cooperation as
activities shift into areas of greater political contestation. For
neofunctionalists, the prescription is not to avoid politics but to
manage it. Cooperation deepens when officials strategically identify
and select tasks that enhance the organization’s authority and that
garner additional support from domestic interest groups and other
sub-state actors, while persuading states that such tasks further their
interests as well. Leadership and skill in agenda setting are, in this
view, important precursors for successful IO expansions.63 The end
result of these efforts, neofunctionalists predict, is slow but inexorable
progress toward integration.64
Although neofunctionalism is strong on issues of endogenous
change where rational choice is weak, it suffers from its own serious
deficiencies.
Its most striking failure was to predict that the
expansion of international cooperation would eventually shift political
loyalties from nation states to IOs. Even in the world’s most
integrated international polity—the European Community—no such
transfer of loyalties has occurred, leading the theory’s proponents to
renounce its more far-reaching claims.65 In addition to its overly

61. Neofunctionalists recognize that IOs change in response to changes in their
environment, but these exogenous forces are not the focus of their analysis. See HAAS, supra note
13, at 129–31.
62. See Tim Büthe & Gabriel T. Swank, The Politics of Antitrust and Merger Review in the
European Union: Institutional Change and Decisions from Messina to 2004 at 6–12 (Dec. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (summarizing history of neofunctionalism and
reviewing writings of scholars who have endorsed it); David Zaring, International Law by Other
Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 281, 313–16 (1998) (same).
63. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 119–25; R.W. Cox, Towards a General Theory of
International Organization, 19 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 99, 101 (1965) (reviewing ERNST B.
HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1964))
[hereinafter Cox, General Theory of IO].
64. Zaring, supra note 62, at 314.
65. See Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, in 25 INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES: RESEARCH SERIES (1975). Recently, however, scholars have begun to
revisit the insights of neofunctionalist theory, in particular as it relates to legal issues. See, e.g.,
Gráinne de Búrca, Rethinking Law in Neofunctionalist Theory, 12 J. EUROPEAN PUB. POL. 310
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sanguine empirical predictions, neofunctionalism’s privileging of
cooperation over conflict makes no allowance for dysfunctional
organizational changes (such as expansions of autonomy that benefit
IO bureaucrats but not domestic actors) or for “the plethora of
outcomes . . . that fall between success and failure.”66
C. Historical Institutionalism and Multiple Sources of Institutional
Change
If neofunctionalism overemphasizes the likelihood of IO
cooperation, and rational choice overstates the ability of nation states
to use institutions to serve rational ends, historical institutionalism
offers a third approach to explain how IOs change over time. Unlike
rational actor models that are based on generic cooperation problems,
historical institutionalism considers the particular historical and
social contexts in which IOs are born and in which they must
survive.67 It recognizes that institutions are established by multiple
actors with divergent and often conflicting preferences. Tensions
within this founding coalition mean that no one group of actors
predominates in specifying an institution’s structures and functions.68
The result is an unavoidable gap between the founders’ goals and the
design features they select to achieve them.69
This gap between goals and institutional structures implies
that even the most homogenous founding coalition will have difficulty
dictating an IO’s functions as it matures. At best, such a coalition can
select design features to achieve functional goals in the short term. As
time horizons lengthen, however, the institution inevitably evolves in
ways that its founders neither anticipated nor intended. Initial design
choices produce unintended consequences that shape and constrain
the future behavior of actors whose identity and composition may have
changed since the time of the organization’s founding.70
Historical institutionalists anticipate that change will occur.
But they do not prejudge its direction, pace, scope, or source. Change
(2005); Philippe C. Schmitter, Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism, 12 J.
EUROPEAN PUB. POL. 255 (2005).
66. Michael G. Huelshoff, Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of
Integration Theory, 38 INT’L STUD. Q. 255, 258 (1994).
67. Katznelson & Weingast, supra note 39, at 4–5.
68. See PIERSON, supra note 37, at 110 (arguing that multiple actors, multiple purposes,
and multiple effects are more pronounced “in the construction of constitutions”). The
constitutions of IOs manifest similar features. See infra Part III.B.
69. Streeck & Thelen, supra note 46, at 11, 19.
70. See PIERSON, supra note 37, at 14–15; Paul Pierson, The Path to European Integration:
A Historical Institutionalist Analysis, 29 COMP. POL. STUD. 123, 147 (1996).
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can be either positive or negative, abrupt or slow. Change can be path
dependent, its direction marked out by the increasing returns and
positive feedback that result from first-generation decisions.71 Or it
can be more fluid and adaptive, evolving incrementally but producing
“transformative results.”72 It can result in modifications to formal
institutional structures or to informal practices and working
methods.73 Perhaps most importantly, change can emanate from
within the organization, from outside it, or from a mix of endogenous
and exogenous sources.
Of the three theories of change discussed in this Article,
historical institutionalism is the most recent. Most of the literature
focuses on domestic political institutions and compares their
geographic differences and temporal development. Scholars analyzing
these issues have created different typologies and frameworks to
categorize change processes within domestic institutions. These
include Streek and Thelen’s five categories of gradual institutional
transformation (displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and
exhaustion);74 Pierson’s analysis of long-term processes of institutional
change (such as positive feedback, path dependence, and
sequencing);75 and Katznelson and Weingast’s effort to bridge
historical institutionalism and rational choice theories.76
Historical institutionalist treatments of IOs are less well
developed, both theoretically and empirically. The most extensive
analysis has been done by Barnett and Finnemore, who work in the
constructivist school of international relations theory. Barnett and
Finnemore view IOs as “active agents in their own change” with a
“propensity toward dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior.”77
They recognize both external and internal sources of change that
emanate from conflicts over material resources or divergent
interpretations of organizational culture.78 Although the causes of
change are diverse, they all point to a common outcome: an expansion
in the size of IOs and the functions they perform.79 Most recently,
Barnett and Coleman have considered IOs as strategic actors that

71. See PIERSON, supra note 37, at 20–30.
72. Streeck & Thelen, supra note 46, at 9 (emphasis omitted).
73. Id. at 19.
74. Id. at 18–31.
75. See PIERSON, supra note 37, at 17–53.
76. Katznelson & Weingast, supra note 39, at 7–21.
77. BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 50, at 3, 158.
78. Id. at 42–43.
79. Id. at 43 (“IOs tend to define both problems and solutions in ways that favor or even
require expanded action for IOs.”).
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seek to “further their mandate, . . . protect their autonomy, and
minimize organizational insecurity.”80 The authors develop a typology
of strategies (acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance,
manipulation, and strategic social construction) that IOs deploy in
response to different levels of organizational security and different
degrees of incongruity between internal organizational culture and the
external environment.81
As
these
diverse
approaches
illustrate,
historical
institutionalism considers multiple sources of change and the
interactions among those sources to explain how institutions adapt,
innovate, or stagnate over time. This capaciousness is one of the
paradigm’s strengths. But it also presents one of its greatest
challenges. For example, historical institutionalism characterizes
some IOs as entrenched and resistant to reform; others as proactive
and seeking to take on new tasks.82
These contrasting
characterizations are possible because of the theory’s emphasis on
context-specific factors and historical contingencies. But this focus
also limits the theory’s predictive power, making it difficult to isolate
the causal contribution of any single explanatory variable and limiting
the policy prescriptions the theory offers for other organizations.83
To address these concerns, empirical studies of IO evolution
that emphasize historical particularities should also strive to identify
common patterns upon which to build working hypotheses that then
can be falsified or refined by other scholars.84 I take up this challenge
in the concluding section of this Article.

80. Barnett & Coleman, supra note 31, at 595.
81. Id. at 600–02.
82. See BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 50, at 2.
83. See Katznelson & Weingast, supra note 39, at 6; see also Tierney & Weaver, supra note
32, at 13 (emphasizing that the processes of how IOs change raise “extremely difficult
questions”).
84. See BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 50, at 164 (asserting, based on historical and
empirical study of three IOs, that “IOs appear to be steadily expanding their mandates in a
convergent direction: all are increasingly involved in the domestic affairs of states, and,
specifically, all are trying to create durable, modern nation-states that are organized around
democracy and markets”).
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D. Summary
The table below summarizes the mechanisms of institutional
change predicted by each of the three theories reviewed above. It
identifies the principal actors who establish IOs, the goals of those
actors, the design features they select to achieve their goals, the
nature of the changes that each theory predicts will occur after the
IO’s founding, how actors respond to those changes, and the expected
outcomes. The table also summarizes the strengths and weaknesses
of each theory.
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Table 1: Theories of Change in International Organizations
Rational choice

NeoFunctionalism

Historical

IO Founders

♦States (usually

♦Government officials

♦States, government

and their Basic

unitary actors)

and private parties

officials, and private parties

Characteristics

♦Rational, self-

♦Self-interested and

♦Actors’ interests and

interested and utility-

utility-maximizing

preferences shaped by

maximizing

♦Domestic actors seek

historical and social contexts

Institutionalism

to expand cooperation
Goals of IO

♦General—Efficiency

♦General—

♦No predetermined

Founders

♦Specific—Joint gains

Cooperation

substantive goals

from inter-state

♦Specific—Mutually

♦Coalitions of actors with

cooperation, e.g.

beneficial rules to

multiple and often

reduced transaction

manage

inconsistent goals

costs, information,

technical/apolitical

monitoring, etc.

issues

Mechanisms

♦Rational selection of

♦Functional selection

♦Tensions among goals and

Used to Achieve

IO design features to

of IO design features to

coalitions of IO founders

Goals at

solve a specific

promote cooperation in

♦Tensions create gaps

Founding of IO

cooperation problem

areas of “low politics”

between goals and chosen

♦Goal clarity

♦IO autonomy

design features

♦Assumption of perfect

sufficient to achieve

♦Rational or functional

or close match between

functional goals

design unlikely or effective

goals and selected

only in short term

design features

♦Variable IO autonomy

♦Limited IO autonomy
Nature of

♦Change frequently

♦Anticipates existence

♦Fact of change anticipated,

Change

ignored

and nature of change

but not its nature or

Predicted After

♦Any change that

♦Formation of

direction

Founding of IO

occurs results from

beneficial alliances

♦IOs develop interests

shifts in state

between IOs and

independent of states

preferences

domestic interest

♦Change viewed as:

♦Change viewed as:

groups

▪Endogenous, exogenous,

▪Exogenous

♦Change viewed as:

or both

▪Infrequent

▪Endogenous

▪Path dependent

▪Sudden and

▪Incremental

▪Result of unanticipated

discontinuous

▪Producing small

consequences

▪Producing large effects

effects

▪Producing punctuated

▪Teleological

equilibria
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Rational choice

NeoFunctionalism

Historical

Expected

♦IOs are (more or less)

♦Expansion of IO

♦Outcomes highly variable:

Outcomes

faithful agents and

autonomy

♦Expansion of IO functions

respond to controls by

♦Cooperation expands

and responsibilities

States principals

from “low politics” to

♦Pathological and inefficient

♦Desired goals

“high politics” issues

self-preservation of IOs

achieved and self-

♦Loyalties shift from

♦Significant IO redesign

reinforcing equilibrium

States to IOs

possible

established (or)

♦Eventual integration

Institutionalism

♦States abandon IO
and establish a rival
institution
Major

Major Strengths:

Major Strengths:

Major Strengths:

Strengths and

♦Simplicity and

♦Models endogenous

♦Models interests of

Weaknesses of

predictability

change

multiple state and non-state

Each

♦Strategic analysis

♦Models expansion of

actors

Theoretical

explains why states

IOs via incremental

♦Includes multiple sources

Framework

create IOs and the

change

of change and both positive

design features they

Major Weaknesses:

and negative outcomes

select

♦No explanation for

Major Weaknesses:

Major Weaknesses:

failures of cooperation

♦Relationship among

♦Difficulty addressing

♦Shift of loyalties to

sources of change difficult to

multiple actors with

IOs disproven

specify

competing goals

empirically

♦Less predictive power

♦Change undertheorized and limited
to exogenous sources

III. DESIGN, EVOLUTION, INNOVATION, AND STAGNATION IN THE ILO
Social science theories of institutional change provide a useful
framework for studying the ILO’s long history of evolution, innovation,
and stagnation. The ILO has survived numerous external and
internal changes since its creation at the end of the First World War.
It would be impossible in the pages of a single book—let alone a single
journal article—to portray the organization’s complex and rich history
in detail.
This Part therefore paints the ILO’s historical portrait with
broader brushstrokes, focusing on two of the organization’s most
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important functions—lawmaking and monitoring.85 I emphasize three
goals that the ILO’s founders sought to achieve with respect to these
functions: (1) universal membership in the organization and
widespread ratification of the treaties it generated (“universality”); (2)
international labor standards durable enough to improve domestic
labor practices but flexible enough to apply to rapidly changing
workplace conditions in countries at different stages of economic
development (“flexibility”); and (3) centralized monitoring mechanisms
to determine whether states were in fact adhering to the standards
they had pledged to follow (“centralization”).
I begin with rational choice. I analyze the different collective
action problems that international labor standards present and
identify the institutional design choices that an abstract analysis of
these problems implies. I then show how these design choices are only
partially and imperfectly embodied in the ILO Constitution,86
reflecting the conflicting political and functional motivations of its
drafters.
After reviewing the ILO’s constitutional architecture from a
rational choice perspective and situating the organization’s birth in a
wider political and historical context, I examine the evolution of ILO
lawmaking and monitoring during the organization’s first two decades
of life. The ILO’s development during this period closely tracks the
endogenous changes predicted by neofunctionalist theory.
In
particular, the first Director General and the ILO Office furthered the
founders’ goals of universality, flexibility, and centralization by
forging alliances with national labor unions in ways that also
expanded the authority of ILO officials and staff.
The historical narrative resumes toward the end of the Second
World War. I document the ILO’s second wave of expansion into new
subject areas and trace this enlargement to changes in the economic
and political environment and to disputes among the ILO’s
increasingly large, diverse, and fractious membership.
These
exogenous changes precipitated a broadening of the ILO’s mandate
into politically contested areas. When added onto the innovations
adopted during the pre-war period, these post-war expansions
generated perverse incentives to adopt treaties that were not widely
ratified, that were normatively incoherent, and that were
inadequately monitored. Taken together, these problems—which
85. See supra text accompanying note 24 (defining ILO lawmaking and ILO monitoring).
86. The ILO Constitution appears as Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles. As explained
below in Part III.D, the constitution was amended after World War II. See generally EBERE
OSIEKE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION
(1985) (providing a detailed analysis of the ILO Constitution and general practices of the ILO).
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track the predictions of some historical institutionalist accounts of
organizational change—hampered the ILO’s effectiveness and
contributed to its current reputation as a weak and ineffectual IO.
A. The Rational Design of International Labor Standards
The protection of international labor standards raises four
interrelated issues that together comprise the “strategic situation”87
facing the ILO: (1) the number of nation states to be governed by those
standards; (2) the type of collective action problem that the standards
attempt to resolve; (3) the uncertainties of regulating workplace
conditions in different countries and in response to changing
industrial practices and improvements in technology; and (4) the
ability of states to deviate from prior commitments as a result of
international law’s weak enforcement mechanisms.88 As I explain
below, the ILO’s founders responded to this strategic situation by
designing an institution with aspirations to (1) universal membership
and widespread treaty ratifications; (2) appropriately flexible
substantive rules; and (3) centralized mechanisms for monitoring
state behavior.89
1. Universality
A rationally designed IO includes all actors that can influence
cooperation in a particular issue area.90 For an IO charged with
creating and monitoring international labor standards, universality is
the optimal membership rule. The ILO’s founders recognized this
point expressly, stating in the preamble to the ILO Constitution that
“the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an
obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the
conditions in their own countries.”91 This statement succinctly

87. See Abbott, supra note 33, at 1 n.4 (defining a strategic situation).
88. See Koremenos et al., supra note 44, at 773 (listing enforcement, number, and
uncertainty, inter alia, as independent variables that states face when seeking resolve collective
action problems).
89. See id. at 769 (listing membership, flexibility, and centralization, inter alia, as
dependent variables that states manipulate when designing IOs to particular strategic
situations).
90. See SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 195–220 (2003) (analyzing the importance of membership
rules in promoting international cooperation); George W. Downs et al, Managing the Evolution of
Multilateralism, 52 INT’L ORG. 397, 398 (1998) (same).
91. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, pmbl. (emphasis added); see also INT’L LAB.
OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION: THE FIRST DECADE 35 (1931) [hereinafter ILO,
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captures the proverbial race-to-the-bottom, a race in which each
country lowers its labor standards in a bid to attract foreign
investment or to give its domestic industries competitive advantages
over foreign exporters. The result is a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma. All
states reduce their labor standards to suboptimal levels but, in the
end, retain their preexisting share of trade or investment after the
race has run its course.92
The ILO attempts to prevent this race to the bottom by
establishing a common baseline of global labor standards that deters
states from entering the race in the first instance.93 If, however, even
one nation remains outside of the organization and the legal
standards it promulgates, it can avoid that common baseline and
exploit its competitive position to the detriment of member nations.
The size of the negative externalities generated by outsider states
depends upon their level of economic development, the size of their
labor markets, and their share of world trade. But the risk of free
riding is present so long as any state remains outside of the
organization or fails to ratify the treaties that articulate global ground
rules for protecting workers and regulating workplace conditions.
The content and function of those global rules, however,
depends upon the type of collective action problem the organization’s
members confront. The ILO’s founders feared a race to the bottom
because they believed that regulating labor and workplace conditions
made nations less competitive, raising the cost of exports and
deterring foreign investment.94 At the same time, and somewhat
paradoxically, they also viewed “the well-being, physical, moral and
intellectual, of industrial wage-earners” as having an intrinsic value
akin to fundamental human rights.95 This alternative vision suggests
THE FIRST DECADE] (stating that “the universality at which the [ILO] must logically aim is three
times emphasised in the Preamble”).
92. See Brian A. Langille, Re-Reading the Preamble to the 1919 ILO Constitution in Light of
Recent Data on FDI and Worker Rights, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 87, 91 (2003) [hereinafter
Langille, Re-Reading the ILO Preamble]; Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8, at 270–71.
93. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 405 (describing procedures for adoption of
international labor standards).
94. See ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 273–74 (noting difficulties in getting
rival states to ratify ILO conventions); Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8, at 261–62 (“Many of
these early efforts were motivated by the concern that in the absence of international labor
standards, international competition in an environment of increasingly freer trade would
precipitate a race to the bottom.”). But see infra note 110 (citing recent empirical studies
indicating that compliance with core labor standards neither increases the cost of exports nor
deters foreign investment, undermining the race-to-the-bottom rationale for international labor
standards).
95. See 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 427; ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note
91, at 28 (stating that the “social justice” element of international labor standards has “moral
value” and is “an end in itself”); Langille, Re-Reading the ILO Preamble, supra note 92, at 98
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that there is in fact no race to enter because nations share a
humanitarian commitment to protect a core group of global labor
rights.
As I explain below, these competing conceptions of
international labor standards have persisted throughout the ILO’s
history, serving as an important tool for changing the structure and
substantive focus of ILO lawmaking and ILO monitoring.
2. Flexibility
A second concern of an IO’s founders is how to adjust the
organization’s rules to reflect the pervasive uncertainties of
international affairs. Because states cooperate under conditions of
incomplete information, they cannot fully predict the behavior and
preferences of other nations, the future application of international
rules, or the state of the world and how it may change over time.96
The founders can mitigate these unknowns by increasing the
flexibility of institutional structures and the treaties and
recommendations that the organization adopts.
Flexibility has numerous advantages. It allows IOs with
universal membership to adjust rules to account for material
differences among member states, it facilitates the revision of rules if
predictions about the future turn out to be inaccurate, and it prevents
IOs and treaties from becoming moribund. Flexibility provisions that
are too generous, however, can reduce the credibility of member states’
commitment to cooperate or do little to change preexisting behaviors.
As a result, “one of the greatest challenges in institutional design is to
find the optimal trade-off between stickiness and flexibility.”97
In the ILO, flexibility concerns cluster around three issues.
The first is whether international labor standards should be protected
in legally binding conventions or nonbinding recommendations. The
ILO’s founders provided for both approaches, recognizing the
advantages of both hard and soft law for regulating workplace

(describing a more empirically accurate view of international labor standards “as part of the
package of interactive economic, social, and political freedoms, which are both the destination
and the way to successful economies and societies”). Commentators disagree, however, over
precisely which labor standards rise to the level of human rights. See Trebilcock & Howse, supra
note 8, at 273.
96. See Koremenos et al., supra note 44, at 778–79 (analyzing the independent variable of
uncertainty); B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of International Trade
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT’L ORG. 829, 832–35 (2001) (discussing escape
clauses and political uncertainty).
97. Barbara Koremenos et al., Rational Design: Looking Back to Move Forward, 55 INT’L
ORG. 1051, 1076 (2001).
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conditions.98 A second flexibility issue concerns how to tailor labor
standards to states at different levels of economic development. The
states that founded the ILO understood the value of accommodating
national differences, particularly for countries with less advanced
economies and labor markets.99 The third dimension of ILO flexibility
is temporal rather than geographic. Labor markets and workplace
conditions can shift rapidly in response to economic, industrial, or
technological changes, rendering existing labor standards outdated or
obsolete. The ILO’s founders were aware of these exogenous changes,
and ILO officials developed detailed lawmaking procedures to revise
and update international labor standards in response to them.100
This trio of issues reveals that calibrating the optimal tradeoff
between durability and flexibility was a pervasive challenge for the
states that supported the ILO’s creation.
3. Centralization
Third and finally, the designers of an IO must consider
whether to create centralized monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms to disseminate information, reduce bargaining and
transaction costs, and review state behavior.101 International law
lacks the built-in enforcement tools found in national legal systems.
As a result, states may deviate from their prior commitments if doing
so generates larger individual gains than those offered by cooperation.
To address this pervasive risk of noncompliance, rational choice
theorists argue either that treaties must be compatible with state
incentives such that adhering to them serves state interests, or that
IOs must include strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to
deter states from cheating.102

98. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 405, ¶ 1 (authorizing the ILO to adopt both
conventions and recommendations).
99. Id. art. 405, ¶ 3 (directing ILO members to consider modifying treaties and
recommendations to accommodate countries with different climatic conditions, less advanced
economies or labor markets, and other special circumstances); id. art. 427 (noting the difficulty of
obtaining “strict uniformity in the conditions of labour”).
100. See ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 33 (describing views of founders
emphasizing “the impossibility of drafting immediately a code which could apply permanently
over a long period and of foreseeing all the future developments . . . which might be aimed at
later”). However, as explained below, infra Part III.C.1, the Constitution itself did not expressly
address the ILO’s power to revise conventions. See C. Wilfred Jenks, The Revision of
International Labour Conventions, 14 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 43, 48 (1933) [hereinafter Jenks,
Revision].
101. Koremenos et al., supra note 44, at 771–72 (describing centralization options).
102. See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996) (describing need for strong enforcement mechanisms to

2006]

GLOBALIZATION AND INNOVATION IN THE ILO

677

From a rational choice perspective, the extent of the ILO’s
monitoring and enforcement challenge depends upon the strategic
issues that international labor standards address. If such standards
seek to forestall a race to the bottom, states will have a strong
incentive to defect. Counteracting that incentive requires a robust
and highly centralized monitoring and enforcement system.103 The
tripartite structure adopted by the ILO’s founders—in which
independent workers’ and employers’ groups have direct membership
rights and can file complaints against countries that fail to comply
with international labor standards—goes a long way toward creating
just such a centralized system.104
If their complaints are
substantiated, the constitution authorizes other governments to
impose economic sanctions against the defaulting state.105
Less centralization is required if labor standards (or at least a
core subset of them) are viewed as universal human rights. Nations
that share a normative commitment to these rights should protect
them without the need for strong monitoring or enforcement.106 The
ILO’s detailed system of state reporting on international labor
standards suggests that its founders endorsed this view, at least in
part. Reports provide an opportunity for workers, employers, and
governments to scrutinize each state’s compliance record.107 And they

encourage compliance with international law); Koremenos et al., supra note 44, at 768
(describing need for “incentive-compatible” rules).
103. See Robert W. Staiger, The International Organization and Enforcement of Labor
Standards 24 (May 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“[E]ffective prevention
of race-to-the-bottom/regulatory-chill problems in the context of labor standards requires that
enforcement measures be put in place and potentially utilized.”); see also Trebilcock & Howse,
supra note 8, at 270 (noting that proponents of the race-to-the-bottom rationale for labor
standards argue that the race “can only be pre-empted by international agreement on and
enforcement of minimum labor standards”).
104. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 409; ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91,
at 71.
105. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 419 (authorizing “measures of an economic
character” for failure to follow recommendations of Commission of Enquiry or Permanent Court
of International Justice). As I discuss more fully below, the ILO amended its constitution after
the Second World War to remove this express reference to economic sanctions. In addition, the
organization has never actually imposed economic sanctions, although it is on the verge of doing
so against Myanmar for its widespread use of forced labor. See infra Part IV.B.3.
106. Note, however, that recent works by rational choice scholars question whether states do
in fact view human rights in this way. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 17, at 110–19
(describing an instrumentalist logic for compliance human rights agreements). Moreover, some
empirical evidence suggests that noncompliance with human rights treaties is often widespread.
Id. at 122–24 (citing several supporting studies).
107. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 408 (requiring ILO member states to file
annual reports “on the measures which it has taken to give effect to the provisions of conventions
to which it is a party” and authorizing the Director General to publicize summaries of the reports
to the entire ILO membership).

678

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:3:649

create a risk of public embarrassment and censure if that record
discloses significant gaps between a state’s behavior and its prior
commitments. Seen from this perspective, ILO reporting procedures
provide a sufficient incentive for states to adhere to core labor
standards even in the absence of strong, centralized enforcement
mechanisms.108
A third possibility is that international labor standards
produce instrumental benefits for all countries, even less developed
nations whose comparative advantage derives from low labor costs.109
A growing number of recent empirical studies conclude that the race
to the bottom has no empirical foundation because “[i]nvestment is
attracted, not repelled, by adherence to core labor standards.”110
Noncompliance is not—as the race to the bottom scenario fears—a
deliberate if ultimately futile attempt to capture unilateral gains, but
rather the result of misguided policies, inadequate information, or a
lack of capacity. If this third conception of international labor
standards is accurate, the appropriate institutional response is a
softer “managerial” approach to centralization that emphasizes
information sharing and technical assistance to help ILO member
states “develop policies which are individually and collectively
rational.”111
108. See Weisband, supra note 8, at 648 (describing shaming as the motivating force behind
the ILO’s monitoring regime).
109. Drusilla K. Brown, Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade
Agenda?, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 102 (2001) (analyzing the “incentives for both high- and lowincome countries to choose high labor standards”).
110. Langille, Re-Reading the ILO Preamble, supra note 92, at 93; see also EMPLOYMENT,
LABOUR & SOC. AFFAIRS COMM. & TRADE COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRADE,
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
(1996),
available
at
http://213.253.134.29/oecd/pdfs/browseit/2296031E.PDF
(demonstrating how adherence to core labor standards increases productivity and costeffectiveness, thereby attracting investment); Drusilla K. Brown, International Trade and Core
Labour Standards: A Survey of the Recent Literature 45, ¶ 262 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation &
Dev., Lab. Mkt. & Soc. Pol’y Occasional Papers, Paper no. 43,
2000), available at
http://puck.sourceoecd.org/vl=1167854/cl=14/nw=1/rpsv/cgi-bin/wppdf?file=5lgsjhvj7rwd.pdf
(“Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that firms are more likely to invest in countries with
some labor protections than in countries with poor labor practices, particularly with regard to
working children.”); David Kucera, The Effects of Core Workers Rights on Labour Costs and
Foreign Direct Investment: Evaluating the “Conventional Wisdom” (Int’l Labour Org., Int’l Inst.
for Labour Studies, Decent Work Research Programme, Discussion Paper No. DP/130/2001,
2001),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp13001.pdf
(rebutting the “conventional wisdom about low-standard countries being a haven for foreign
investors”); Flanagan, supra note 11, at 46 (stating that available “data show no reliable
evidence that high labor standards reduce a country’s share of” foreign direct investment).
111. Langille, Re-Reading the ILO Preamble, supra note 92, at 96; see also ABRAM CHAYES &
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 22–28 (1995) (advocating a “managerial approach” to promote
compliance with international law).
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B. The Birth of the ILO: Balancing Functional and Political Goals
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the founders of the ILO
were motivated by three broad functional objectives. They believed
that all nations should be members of the organization and should
accept the conventions and recommendations that it adopted. They
wanted ILO lawmaking to be sufficiently flexible to account for
geographic and economic differences among its member states and
changes in workplace conditions around the world. And they sought
to centralize the monitoring of international labor standards by
creating a system of complaints, state reports, and information
sharing that responded to the different (and somewhat conflicting)
collective action problems that the organization faced.
This
multiplicity of institutional goals belies the claim of some rational
choice scholars that IOs are established to serve a single functional
purpose.112
The rational choice aspects of the ILO’s birth should not be
overstated, however. The founders of the organization were motivated
by political as well as functional goals, and the design features they
selected to promote universality, flexibility, and centralization were
only imperfectly reflected in the ILO Constitution.113 True, the ILO’s
distinctive tripartite structure gave actors closest to the industrial
workplace a direct and independent voice in creating and monitoring
international labor standards. But in addition to these functional
benefits of tripartism, short-term political anxieties provided an
equally pressing motivation for the ILO’s founders to grant
membership to non-state actors.
Industrialized governments in Europe feared that the Russian
Revolution of 1917 would spread communism westward, fomenting
violent regime change elsewhere on the continent. Better that
workers should channel their reformist energies in an institutional
setting than for those energies to remain pent up and eventually be
unleashed in political unrest. As one scholar pithily encapsulated
these fears, “[t]he ILO was Versailles’ answer to Bolshevism.”114 For
that answer to serve as an attractive alternative to revolution,
however, states would need to create an IO with at least a modicum of
independent authority and provide workers with a voice in shaping
the exercise of that authority to create and enforce global labor
standards.
112. See supra Part II.A.
113. Cf. HAAS, supra note 13, at 141–42 (referring to “constitutional weaknesses built into
the ILO Constitution”).
114. Cox, Limited Monarchy, supra note 13, at 102.
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Even acknowledging these fears of labor unrest, states were
wary of delegating substantial autonomy to the nascent organization.
They categorically rejected worker proposals to make labor
conventions automatically binding in domestic legal systems.115 This
ensured that whatever international labor standards the ILO adopted,
governments would have the final say in deciding whether those
standards would apply in their respective national labor markets. In
addition, the power of the purse and the authority to impose economic
sanctions remained with the ILO’s parent organization, the League of
Nations.116 By retaining an institutional umbilical cord to the
League—an IO in which only states were members—founding
governments believed they could retain significant control over the
ILO and prevent it from taking actions contrary to their interests.117
The ILO’s cabined authority is also reflected in the
constitutional provisions describing the functions of the Director
General and the ILO Office. The ILO Governing Body, the executive
organ of the ILO, appoints the Director General, who in turn appoints
the ILO staff and manages the ILO Office “subject to the instructions
of the Governing Body.”118 The constitution specifies the Office’s
functions, which include collecting and distributing information,
examining issues for future treaty-making, and preparing the agenda
for the annual meeting of the International Labor Conference.119 More
consequential authority, such as the power to review state reports, to
interpret treaties, and to review complaints remained with the ILO’s
political bodies or with the member states themselves.120
Taken together, these constitutional provisions and the
historical and social context in which they were fashioned reflect the
ILO’s uneasy mix of functional and political goals and its founders’
equivocal endorsement of an IO tasked with creating and enforcing
global labor standards.
Given this ambiguous constitutional
blueprint, the ILO’s founding governments could reasonably expect
the organization to diffuse the potential for post-war labor unrest by
adopting treaties and recommendations to address the most pressing
115. See ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 32.
116. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, arts. 399 & 420.
117. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 143 (explaining how the “final power of action continued to
rest with governments” in the League of Nations) (emphasis omitted); see generally Cox, Limited
Monarchy, supra note 13, at 102–03 (describing the origins and development of the ILO in the
context of the League of Nations).
118. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 394, ¶ 1.
119. Id. art. 396, ¶¶ 2–3, and 402. The Office’s agenda-setting function is subject to the right
of any government to object to the inclusion of any item in the agenda.
120. See id. arts 408–20 (allocating these powers to the member states or to ILO political
bodies).
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safety, heath, and social problems of the early twentieth-century
workplace. But they would not have anticipated that the ILO would
venture much beyond this mandate.121
C. Early Innovations
It was the first ILO Director General, Albert Thomas, and the
staff of the ILO Office who, in the organization’s first two decades
from 1919 to 1939, expanded the organization’s authority well beyond
this restricted role.122 The Director General and the Office exploited
constitutional ambiguities and adopted working methods to enhance
the ILO’s functional goals notwithstanding the founders’ limited
delegation of authority.
These expansions of authority were facilitated by the successful
efforts of ILO officials to cultivate support from workers’ groups.
These officials sought to bolster organized labor—both trade unions
participating in the ILO’s tripartite membership and those active in
national labor markets—to foster industrial democracies in which
workers would be equal partners with employers and governments.123
The Director General and his staff expended considerable effort to
strengthen domestic trade unions and encourage their participation in
the organization. Their aim was “to promote social justice through
international labor standards” and to turn the ILO into the agent for
“transforming the world into a system of pluralistic welfare societies
closely integrated internationally.”124

121. See 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, pmbl. (identifying workplace conditions
requiring international attention); HAAS, supra note 13, at 144 (stating that governments did not
“feed [new] demands into the ILO because they had not expected the need for any policy” beyond
those specified in the constitution).
122. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 144, 143 (recounting the “self-consciously dynamic
polic[ies]” adopted by the first ILO Director General Albert Thomas and describing the pre-war
evolution of the ILO as an “unintended consequence of the very immediate and expediential
governmental concern” of its founders); E.J. PHELAN, YES AND ALBERT THOMAS 245–57 (1936)
(reviewing competence-expanding activities of ILO’s first Director General and his support of
worker delegates); Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour
Organisation, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 580, 613 (Philip Alston ed., 1992)
(“The Office plays a leadership role in promoting the objectives of the ILO . . . . ILO officials have
been initiators in the work of the Organisation, considering themselves not as simple executors
of the desires of member States, but rather as collaborators in the pursuit of social justice.”).
123. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 145 (describing the ILO as a “coordinator and unifier of
national trade groups”); PHELAN, supra note 122, at 240–47 (explaining Director General
Thomas’s vision of the ILO as a collaboration of national trade unions).
124. Cox, Limited Monarchy, supra note 13, at 122; see also C. WILFRED JENKS, THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM 519, 522 (1957) (arguing that support of
worker organizations was essential to development of additional authority by ILO Office).
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As I document below, ILO officials sought to achieve these
ambitious and lofty goals in three ways: (1) by encouraging more
nations to join the organization and to ratify worker-protection
treaties; (2) by developing innovative lawmaking procedures to
balance the competing demands of stability and flexibility; and (3) by
enhancing centralized monitoring procedures to promote compliance
with a rapidly growing body of international labor standards. Many of
these legal innovations have long been forgotten. For observers in the
inter-war period, however, the ILO was viewed as a highly effective
organization and a model for other IOs to follow.125
1. Promoting Widespread Membership and Treaty Ratifications
“[O]ne of the chief preoccupations” of the first generation of
ILO officials was to “increase the number of ILO Members as much as
possible.”126 The ILO’s status as an offspring of the League of Nations
presented an obstacle to expanding the organization’s geographic and
demographic scope. According to the constitution, all members of the
League were automatically members of the ILO.127 But what of those
countries—including powerful or populous nations such as the United
States, Germany, and the Soviet Union—which refused to join the
League or which were ineligible to become League members?
The constitution did not address this question. But throughout
the 1920s, non-League members applied for and received admission to
the organization. Universality arguments invoking fears of a race to
the bottom carried the day, with the existing membership accepting
the Office’s contention that “inhuman [labor] conditions in even a
single country may, through international competition, arrest or
compromise social progress in every other country.”128

125. See MARK F. IMBER, THE USA, ILO, UNESCO, AND IAEA: POLITICIZATION AND
WITHDRAWAL IN THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES 43 (1989) (noting the praise and respect the ILO
received from other IOs during the inter-war period); C. Wilfred Jenks, The Need for an
International Legislative Drafting Bureau, 39 AMER. J. INT’L L. 163, 172–73 (1945) [hereinafter
Jenks, Legislative Drafting Bureau] (detailing the careful and effective methods of treaty-making
in the ILO’s first two decades); Charles W. Pipkin, Relations with the League of Nations, in
ANNALS ILO ISSUE, supra note 13, at 124, 128 (describing the successful leadership of the ILO
during the inter-war years).
126. ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 35; see also Josef Sulkowski, The Problem of
Universal Membership in the International Labor Organisation 5 ÖSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT 70, 70–72 (1952–53) (describing the ILO’s goal of universal
membership).
127. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 387.
128. ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 35; see also id. at 36–41 (discussing legal and
political issues regarding admission of new members to the ILO).
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The ILO Office quickly went to work encouraging non-members
to join the organization. The absence of the United States prior to
1934 was especially troubling, and the Office did “all in its power to
induce the United States to take part in” the work of the organization,
establishing relationships with “official and private bodies” to
encourage American participation and ultimately ratification.129 The
Office also provided non-members, including the Soviet Union, with
studies of their domestic labor problems and tried to persuade states
to join with promises of additional information and technical
assistance.130 In part as a result of these efforts, the ILO membership
expanded from forty-five states at its inception in 1919 to sixty-two
states by the mid-1930s.
The drive to promote ratification of labor treaties evolved
somewhat differently. The ILO Constitution obligated member states
to submit all conventions and recommendations to their respective
political branches to encourage adoption of the instruments.131 But it
soon became clear that this mandatory submission procedure would
not ensure widespread ratification of the treaties.
At the Office’s urging, the ILO adopted several procedural
innovations to encourage states to ratify. First, the Office developed
an “exceptionally thorough and detailed” process for drafting treaties
to ensure that each of their provisions had “been subjected to intensive
scrutiny and discussion prior to adoption.”132 To further encourage the
membership’s support, the ILO Conference gave two separate reviews
to all draft conventions.133 And to make treaties more politically
palatable, it gave governments alone the right to submit amendments
prior to the draft’s second reading.134
A second deterrent to ratification stemmed from ambiguous
provisions in certain conventions. Beginning in the early 1920s,
governments asked the Office to clarify these ambiguities. ILO
officials responded cautiously to these requests, inasmuch as the
constitution entrusted all interpretive functions to the Permanent
Court of International Justice.135 States were unwilling, however, to
invoke this formal adjudicatory process, and the Office responded to
the demand for its services by providing unofficial interpretations of
129. Id. at 43.
130. Id. at 42–46, 328–31; ALCOCK, supra note 2, at 118–33.
131. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 405, ¶ 5.
132. J.F. McMahon, The Legislative Techniques of the International Labour Organization, 41
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 93 (1965–66).
133. OSIEKE, supra note 86, at 148–51, 167.
134. Id.
135. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 423.
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conventions and publishing them for the benefit of the entire
membership.136 In undertaking this new task, the Office stressed the
technical and specialized knowledge it had acquired in drafting the
conventions and in promoting their implementation.137 No state ever
challenged its authority, with the result that “[t]he ILO secretariat,
without explicit constitutional warrant, [became] the principal organ
for rendering these effectively conclusive but formally advisory
interpretations.”138 An important consequence of these new powers
was the Office’s ability to reassure states that had expressed concerns
about textual ambiguities and thereby “remove[] obstacles inhibiting
ratification” of the treaties.139
A third procedural innovation by which ILO officials
encouraged treaty ratifications while simultaneously expanding their
own authority was the Office’s practice of collecting and publishing
information on compliance with recommendations and unratified
conventions.140 The effects of this practice were threefold. First, in
the case of recommendations, the information helped to pave the way
for the later adoption of a convention on the same subject. Second, in
the case of treaties, it created a fund of practical experience
concerning domestic labor laws and practices upon which the Office
could draw to ease the concerns of non-ratifying states. And third,
collecting information on both ratified and unratified conventions
blurred the distinction between the two categories of instruments,
reducing the consequences of ratification.141
In practice, however, these three procedural innovations
produced only modest results. The total number of ratifications of all
ILO treaties grew at a steady rate, from 27 in 1921 to 408 in 1930 to
873 in 1939.142 But these figures amounted to only about 25% of the
136. See C. Wilfred Jenks, The Interpretation of International Labour Conventions by the
International Labour Office, in Notes, 20 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 132, 132–41 (1939) (detailing the
frequency with which the Office gives unofficial interpretations); ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra
note 91, at 276 (discussing the member states’ preference for such interpretations).
137. McMahon, supra note 132, at 91–96 (noting the Office’s “exceptional and special
knowledge” in reviewing practices of ILO member states and preparing drafts of conventions).
138. ALVAREZ, supra note 17, at 226 (internal punctuation omitted).
139. McMahon, supra note 132, at 100.
140. See ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 267–76, 310–12, 317–20 (discussing
efforts by Office to overcome obstacles to ratification and to gather information on the
implementation of recommendations).
141. In recent years, the Office has continued to stress the influence of unratified
conventions and recommendations on the domestic laws and practices of member states. See
INT’L LAB. OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 11–26 (1976) [hereinafter INT’L LAB. OFFICE, IMPACT OF CONVENTIONS].
142. ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 277; ILO, Statistics on Ratification, supra
note 10, graph 1.
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total possible ratifications by all member states. As I explain in the
next section, the ILO Office took great pains to explain why universal
ratification was neither realistic nor, in some cases, desirable,143 even
as it continued to press for additional ratifications by member states
with widely different industrial and economic conditions.
2. Creating and Revising Flexible International Labor Standards
The drafters of the ILO Constitution recognized that
international labor standards could not be applied uniformly in all
countries and would need to be updated in response to changing
workplace conditions and technological advances. Yet they provided
surprisingly little guidance on how to achieve these goals or on how to
reconcile them with the organization’s competing aspirations to
universal membership. Again, it was the ILO Office that responded to
these challenges.
The Office promoted, and the ILO membership adopted, a
systematic approach to make labor conventions and recommendations
relevant to the diverse and changing conditions of the early 20th
century workplace. It distributed questionnaires to solicit information
from governments, conducted studies of national laws and labor
practices, and provided numerous opportunities for review and
comment by all three branches of the ILO’s tripartite membership.
The Office played an agenda setting role in each of these areas,
drafting questionnaires, studies, and the texts of treaties and
recommendations for the consideration of ILO delegates.144
Several features of this standard setting process are
particularly noteworthy.
First, the ILO promulgated in rapid
succession a series of conventions and recommendations that extended
international labor standards to an increasingly broad array of
workers and workplace issues.145 The brisk pace of lawmaking began
with the very first ILO Conference in 1919, where the membership
approved six treaties. Over the next two decades, the ILO adopted
143. See id. at 278 (stating that it would be “unreasonable” to expect ratification of maritime
conventions by non-maritime states). But see infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text
(describing the practice of “empty ratifications” of maritime conventions by some landlocked
states).
144. See McMahon, supra note 132, at 62–65 (describing the drafting procedure); Jenks,
Legislative Drafting Bureau, supra note 125, at 172–73 (explaining the need for a uniform
drafting technique).
145. See Francis Maupain, Is the ILO Effective in Upholding Workers’ Rights?: Reflections on
the Myanmar Experience, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 85, 91 (Philip Alston ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Maupain, Reflections on Myanmar] (discussing the expansion of the ILO’s mandate
by the Permanent Court of International Justice, which held that the organization’s jurisdiction
covered all workers).
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sixty-one
additional
conventions
and
sixty-six
separate
recommendations.146
Second, ILO officials attempted to strike a balance between
standards that established a minimum baseline for all members and
more lenient standards for countries with less advanced economies
and labor markets.147 The Office developed a dual strategy to achieve
these competing goals. First, it successfully resisted attempts by
member states to file reservations to the treaties after they had been
adopted.
It justified this position—one without precedent in
international law—on the ground that reservations were inconsistent
with the ILO’s tripartite structure and with its objective of
establishing “a network of mutual obligations” that would prevent
states from entering a race to the bottom in their scramble for a
greater share of global trade and investment.148
In the place of these unilateral exclusions, the ILO Office
promoted a diverse array of flexibility devices to customize treaties to
fit different economic, social, and geographic conditions.
Some
conventions identified specific countries (usually developing nations)
and the differential (usually lower) standards that applied to them.
Others contained only general principles, with more detailed rules
relegated to accompanying recommendations on the same topic. Still
other treaties permitted ratification in parts or allowed states to
exclude the treaty’s application to designated industries or categories
of workers.149 These diverse textual approaches helped to make the
treaties more relevant and more politically palatable to a broad crosssection of ILO member states.
A third flexibility issue the organization confronted concerned
the revision of treaties. The ILO’s founders recognized that workplace
conditions and workers’ needs would change rapidly over time. But
they failed to provide any procedures for amending outdated
conventions.150 As a result of this missing joist in the constitutional
architecture, the ILO could not revise or abrogate a treaty after it had
146. Nicolas Valticos, Fifty Years of Standard-Setting Activities by the International Labour
Organisation, 135 INT’L LAB. REV. 393, 399 (1996).
147. See id. at 402.
148. McMahon, supra note 132, at 80; see also id. at 77–85 (discussing history of and
rationales for ban on reservations).
149. See J.M. Servais, Flexibility and Rigidity in International Labour Standards, 125 INT’L
LAB. REV. 193 (1986) (detailing the flexibility devices used in ILO conventions); VALTICOS & VON
POTOBSKY, supra note 3, at 55–61 (same).
150. See ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 91, at 33 (describing the founders’ awareness
that ILO would need to address new labor issues in the future); id. at 86 (stating that the
problem of revision of conventions “is not mentioned” in the Constitution of 1919 but “it was
bound to arise sooner or later”).
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entered into force. The only permissible alternative was to adopt a
second convention on the same subject. A state wishing to adopt the
newer standard would then ratify the “revising convention” and
formally denounce the earlier treaty.151 Yet the earlier treaties
continued to remain in force for countries that wished to retain the
older standards.152 This was a cumbersome solution to the problem of
treaty revision, since it created new treaties without eliminating old
ones.153 But it enabled the ILO Office to close the gap in the
constitution and provided—at least temporarily—a mechanism to
update international labor rules.154
3. Enhancing Centralized Monitoring
With a growing membership and an expanding corpus of labor
standards, the ILO Office naturally turned its attention to issues of
monitoring and compliance. As described above, the ILO Constitution
provided two ways to review state behavior—annual reports on
ratified conventions and complaints by workers, employers, or
governments.155 But the constitution failed to address numerous
procedural details, leaving ample room for ILO officials to propose
functional solutions that resulted in a marked expansion of the
organization’s monitoring powers.156
The earliest and most important innovation involved the
creation of a permanent body of independent experts to review reports
filed by member states on ratified treaties. The constitution entrusted
151. Jenks, Revision, supra note 100, at 49–52.
152. E.g., Marking of Weight (Packages Transported by Vessels) Convention, art. 7, ¶¶ 2–3,
June 21, 1929, ILOLEX No. C27, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm
(providing that, on the date that a revising convention entered into force, the original convention
would be closed to future ratifications but would remain in force for those states that had
previously ratified it).
153. Maritime labor treaties provide an apt illustration. The ILO Conference adopted the
first Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention in 1946. June 29, 1946, ILOLEX No.
C76, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm. The treaty was followed three
years later, however, by the Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention (Revised),
1949, and nine years after that by a second revising convention, Wages, Hours of Work and
Manning (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1958. June 18, 1949, ILOLEX No. C93, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm; May 14, 1958, ILOLEX No. C109, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm.
154. As I explain in the next section, this approach to treaty revision later created problems
for the organization. See infra Part III.E.2.
155. For detailed discussions, see OSIEKE, supra note 86, at 171–83, 210–34; T.K. Samson,
The Changing Pattern of ILO Supervision, 118 INT’L LAB. REV. 569, 569–80 (1979).
156. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 251 (describing expanding reporting obligations for member
states); id. at 348–50 (comparing constitutionally mandated procedures with those that have
been developed ad hoc by the ILO); JENKS, ILO IMPACT, supra note 13, at 42 (explaining changes
in supervisory procedures).
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the review of these reports to the Director General, but it soon became
clear that he could not process the vast quantity of information that
states provided. In the mid-1920s, a few governments proposed a
standing committee to consider state reports. Mollified by assurances
from the Office that the committee would be limited to the technical
issue of comparing national laws to treaty texts, the remaining
member states agreed to the proposal.157
Once created, however, the “Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations” quickly enlarged
its authority. With the support of information from worker delegates,
the Committee sought out additional information from governments,
and it asked for an evaluation of the problems that they had
encountered in giving domestic effect to the treaties. Armed with this
knowledge, the Committee could engage in pointed exchanges with
state representatives and offer specific recommendations for remedial
action.158 By the end of the interwar period, the Committee of Experts
had become a “mainstay of ILO supervision.”159
Procedures for convening a Commission of Inquiry to review
allegations of noncompliance followed a different evolutionary
pathway. No state invoked these procedures during the ILO’s first
two decades.160 But the ILO Office helped to establish an important
precedent that expanded the pool of potential complainants when it
confirmed that an ambiguous provision in the constitution allowed
workers and employers to request a Commission of Inquiry.161 The
Office thus transformed a procedure that many governments would
have preferred to be restricted to interstate complaints—a form of

157. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 252; OSIEKE, supra note 86, at 173.
158. An early observer noted that the Committee of Experts “presents critical observations,
acknowledges responses of governments, discusses them, refutes them, formulates commentaries
on the interpretations presented, and advances suggestions.” HAAS, supra note 13, at 253
(translating and quoting JEAN ZARRAS, LE CONTROLE DE L’APPLICATION DES CONVENTIONS
INTERNATIONALES DU TRAVAIL 173 (1937)). Committee members were careful, however, to couch
their conclusions in the form of “observations” rather than “criticisms.” Id.
159. Samson, supra note 155, at 569.
160. See ALCOCK, supra note 2, at 280 (describing first Commission of Inquiry, convened in
1961 to respond to a complaint by Ghana against Portugal); HAAS, supra note 13, at 362 (same).
161. See OSIEKE, supra note 86, at 223 & n.124 (noting legal dispute over whether workers
and employers could submit complaints that could trigger the creation of a Commission of
Inquiry).
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treaty monitoring that is often underutilized162—into one in which
workers and employers could raise compliance challenges directly.163
4. Theoretical Assessment
From a theoretical perspective, the expansion of lawmaking
and monitoring during the ILO’s first two decades closely tracks the
predictions of neofunctionalism. The Director General and the ILO
Office acted as autonomous agents with interests distinct from those
of the states that created their positions. Officials brought about
change endogenously and incrementally, seeking support from worker
delegates at the ILO, building connections to national trade unions,
and using their expertise in information gathering, analysis, and
agenda setting to shape the demands and expectations of member
states.
These events also provide an opportunity to assess rational
choice and historical institutionalist accounts of change in IOs. Most
obviously, the historical narrative reveals that the behavior of IOs
cannot be explained, as some rational choice theories claim, by
examining state interests alone or by an analysis that is frozen at a
specific moment in time. Rational choice analysis is, however, useful
for identifying the functional objectives of an IO’s founders and the
design features they select to achieve them. It is these goals and
design choices, in turn, that shape the strategies for change deployed
by first-generation IO officials and staff.
Notably, the Director General and the Office did not expand
lawmaking and monitoring authority by means of a raw power grab.
Such an attempt surely would have provoked a backlash from member
states. Instead, officials made common cause with organized labor
while stressing the universality, flexibility, and centralization goals
that had animated the organization since its inception. They justified
each modest expansion on functional grounds, taking small individual
steps that ultimately produced a substantial expansion of the
organization’s powers from within.
This process echoes some
historical institutionalist accounts of how domestic institutions evolve,
a process characterized by “incremental change with transformative
results.”164
162. See David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in International
Environmental Law, 79 IOWA L. REV. 769, 779 (1994) (describing limitations of interstate dispute
settlement procedures).
163. Recent Commissions of Inquiry have been overwhelmingly requested by non-state
actors. See VALTICOS & VON POTOBSKY, supra note 3, at 290–93.
164. Streeck & Thelen, supra note 46, at 9.
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The endogenous changes that occurred during the ILO’s first
twenty years did not, however, insulate the ILO from exogenous
shocks. The Great Depression of the 1930s presented a serious
challenge to the organization, generating acrimonious divisions among
workers, employers, and governments that resulted in a slow-down of
treaty ratifications and the rejection of half a dozen draft conventions
intended to mitigate the depression’s labor-related hardships.165 But
ILO officials made limited progress even on these contentious topics,
for example by successfully advocating for the adoption of a new
convention regulating the length of the work week.166 Far more
importantly, they preserved their expanded authority over ILO
lawmaking and monitoring—no small feat in the face of a sharp
downturn in the global economy and the soon-to-be fatal political
challenges to its parent organization, the League of Nations.
D. Post-War Transitions and Subject Matter Expansions
The innovations described in the previous section enabled the
ILO to create international labor standards that responded to
changing workplace conditions and to the evolving demands of its
tripartite membership. But these adaptive efforts also helped the
organization to weather the cataclysmic changes that occurred during
and after the Second World War. During the hostilities, the ILO
decamped from its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland to Montreal,
Canada.167 Lawmaking, treaty ratifications, and monitoring slowed to
a crawl and the organization’s membership shrank with the
withdrawal of the Axis Powers and countries in their orbit.168
As the war neared its end, attention shifted to the ILO’s future.
Aware that the League would not survive the conflict, ILO officials
and worker organizations sought to position the organization to take
the preeminent role in social and economic aspects of the post-war
geopolitical order.169 The Declaration of Philadelphia, adopted in May
165. See ALCOCK, supra note 2, at 99 (describing decline in ratifications); id. at 110–12
(outlining failure to adopt conventions concerning unemployment and social security).
166. See id. at 110 (discussing the Forty-Hour Week Convention, June 4, 1935, ILOLEX No.
C47, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm); see also Cox, General Theory of
IO, supra note 63, at 102 (stating that at “critical moments in [the ILO’s] history, its leadership
has put forward bold programs” and citing the “anti-depression program” of Director General
Harold Butler).
167. ALCOCK, supra note 2, at 160–61.
168. Id. at 151–70, 171 n.1 (discussing the ILO’s activities during World War II); VALTICOS &
VON POTOBSKY, supra note 3, at 33 (stating that ILO membership fell from sixty-two states in
the 1930s to forty-eight states in the early 1940s).
169. See Edward Phelan, Acting Dir., Int’l Lab. Office, Address at the International Labour
Conference (May 10, 1944), in INT’L LAB. OFFICE, “A NEW ERA”: THE PHILADELPHIA CONFERENCE
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1944, provided the blueprint for a redefinition of the ILO’s goals. In
addition to lofty aspirational statements endorsing individual
freedom, economic security, and poverty eradication, the Declaration
set out an ambitious agenda of social and economic policy reforms.170
The Declaration’s drafters intended these statements to broaden the
organization’s mandate, and, in so doing, “to define the part the ILO
should play in the new order of economic co-operation to be
established by the United Nations.”171
Securing a place in the new political order was no easy task.
The ILO was “an embarrassing reminder of the League,”172 and the
Soviet Union believed that its interests would be better served in
other forums.173 In the end, the ILO settled for autonomy rather than
primacy. It entered into an agreement with the United Nations
designating it as a specialized agency of that multilateral body, but
not before overhauling the Constitution of 1919 to enshrine its
expanded social and economic mandate. The new Constitution of
1946174 incorporated the Declaration of Philadelphia as an Annex.
But it also recognized the ILO’s autonomy over its budget and
membership (both problematic aspects of its relationship to the now
defunct League) and augmented its lawmaking and monitoring
functions.175 With respect to the latter issue, the most significant
change required states to report on the extent of their compliance with
unratified ILO conventions and to indicate the impediments that
prevented or delayed such treaties’ future ratification.176
AND THE FUTURE OF THE I.L.O. 132–45 (1944) (discussing the post-war future of the ILO); see also
HAAS, supra note 13, at 152 (noting that, in response to “the very real challenge of a drastically
changed international environment,” the ILO Office increasingly “assumed the role of the leader
and executive, the initiator and promoter of policy”).
170. Int’l Lab. Org., Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International
Labour Organization (adopted May 10, 1944 in Philadelphia), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm#annex. The specific policy goals included
promoting full employment, raising living standards, recognizing the right of collective
bargaining, protecting life and health in all occupations, and protecting equality of educational
and vocational opportunity. Id.
171. ALCOCK, supra note 2, at 184.
172. Id. at 171.
173. Cox, Limited Monarchy, supra note 13, at 104 (describing the Soviet Union’s preference
“that labor interests be expressed directly through the new United Nations machinery”); VICTORYVES GHEBALI, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION: A CASE STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION
OF U.N. SPECIALISED AGENCIES 104–07 (1989) (detailing Soviet hostility to the ILO).
174. Constitution of the International Labour Organization, as amended Oct. 9, 1946, 62
Stat. 3485, 15 U.N.T.S. 35 [hereinafter 1946 ILO Constitution].
175. HAAS, supra note 13, at 161–66; see also VALTICOS & VON POTOBSKY, supra note 3, at
19, 46–47 (arguing that the Declaration of Philadelphia expanded the ILO’s regulatory
authority).
176. 1946 ILO Constitution, supra note 174, art. 19.5(e).
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Taken together, the Declaration and the new constitution
appeared to presage an influential role for the ILO. The organization
quickly returned to a rapid pace of treaty-making, using the
procedures that ILO officials had developed in the 1920s and 1930s.177
But this lawmaking activity, and the monitoring functions that
inevitably accompanied it, occurred in an environment that had
changed radically from the one in which the ILO operated before the
war. Three factors in particular shaped the ILO’s activities during the
post-war period: (1) an expanded and increasingly diverse group of
member states and worker and employer representatives; (2)
competition with other IOs; and (3) a prolonged period of economic
prosperity. As I explain below, these three changes acted as catalysts
that vastly expanded the ILO’s subject matter mandate.
First, the number of ILO member states increased rapidly in
the 1950s and 1960s, initially when the Soviet Union and other
socialist nations joined or rejoined the organization and later as
former colonies in Africa and Asia gained independence. With the
admission of these new members, the ILO became a site of trenchant
Cold War clashes between East and West (which took the form of
challenges to the independence of worker delegations from socialist
nations and reciprocal claims that those countries were violating
forced labor standards) and decolonization battles between North and
South (which were reflected in politically-motivated challenges to
labor practices in South Africa, in former colonial powers, and in
Israel).178 As before the war, the Director General and the ILO Office
continued to press for new initiatives in particular subject areas.179
But these independent efforts by ILO officials now competed with new
demands of governments and workers from developing countries,
leading to “greater heterogeneity of ideologies and objectives among

177. See GERARD J. MANGONE, A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 226
(1954) (describing post-war efforts to draft additional labor conventions).
178. See Cox, Limited Monarchy, supra note 13, at 105; GHEBALI, supra note 173, at 104–07.
These politically motivated events were the catalyst of the temporary withdrawal of the United
States from the ILO between 1977 and 1980. See IMBER, supra note 125, at 58 (analyzing
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s argument that the United States’ withdrawal was
precipitated by, inter alia, the ILO’s “disregard for due process and increasing politicization”).
179. See MORSE, supra note 2, at 45–76 (describing initiatives promoted by Director General
between 1948 and 1968).
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the membership.”180 The result was a vast “proliferation of program
demands.”181
Second, the ILO experienced new forms of competition from
other international bodies, in particular from the human rights
activities of the United Nations Economic and Social Council.182 In
the late 1940s and 1950s, the ILO vied for policy dominance with this
new rival by adopting human rights treaties on forced labor, freedom
of association, and equality in employment.183 The ILO Office also
sought to influence human rights treaties drafted in the United
Nations by providing expert analysis of their labor rights provisions.184
Finally, the ILO created—contrary to the wishes of some UN human
rights officials—a specialized monitoring body to protect the rights of
trade unions.185 This new Committee on Freedom of Association soon
developed into a “major innovation” in ILO monitoring, reviewing
numerous workers’ complaints against countries regardless of whether
they had ratified ILO treaties protecting freedom of association.186 As
these examples illustrate, competition with other IOs spurred a
marked expansion of ILO activities relating to human rights.
Third and finally, favorable economic circumstances helped to
foment an expansion of the ILO’s competence. “‘[T]hirty glorious’
years” of post-war prosperity and growth in industrialized countries
“encouraged governments and enterprises to show generosity” in

180. Cox, Limited Monarchy, supra note 13, at 105; see also Efrén Córdova, Some Reflections
on the Overproduction of International Labor Standards, 14 COMP. LAB. L.J. 138, 144 (1993)
(describing how worker groups “press for inclusion of standards specific to their sector in the
International Labor Code”); HAAS, supra note 13, at 167, 242 (discussing demand for new labor
standards in former colonial territories).
181. HAAS, supra note 13, at 171.
182. See Leary, supra note 122, at 587–88.
183. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 166–68; see also Fundamental ILO Conventions, available
at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/whatare/fundam/ (listing dates of adoption of
ILO human rights treaties).
184. See Philip Alston, The United Nations’ Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
79, 94 (1979); Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the
Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 480–81 (2004).
185. See JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS 83–84 (1984)
(discussing the UN’s desire for a joint UN-ILO commission to protect trade union rights); Leary,
supra note 122, at 602–03 (discussing UN opposition to ILO Freedom of Association Committee).
186. Philip Alston, “Core Labour Standards” and the Transformation of the International
Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 457, 481 (2004). The authority to review the conduct of
non-ratifying states derived from the ILO Constitution, which protects freedom of association.
“[It] has therefore been held that this principle should be observed by all [member states] by
virtue of their membership [in] the Organization alone.” VALTICOS & VON POTOBSKY, supra note
3, at 295.

694

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:3:649

This generosity enabled the
response to worker demands.187
organization to make good on the promises of the Declaration of
Philadelphia by extending ILO treaty-making into “broad subjects of
employment and social policies.”188
During this period, the
organization adopted conventions and recommendations on subjects as
diverse as welfare, workers’ education and training, rural
development, colonial working conditions, and workers’ health and
medical benefits.189
E. Institutional Stagnation
The previous section reviewed three factors—a larger, more
diverse and more assertive membership, competition with the newlycreated United Nations, and a prolonged period of global economic
prosperity—that acted as catalysts for expanding the ILO’s activities.
As before the war, the organization continued to draft detailed
regulations for specific industries and workplace problems. But it also
broadened its subject matter focus to include new initiatives in human
rights, social policy, and economic development.
At first, ILO officials successfully managed the more wideranging lawmaking and monitoring activities that these changes
precipitated. Over time, however, the expansion of the ILO’s functions
exposed deeper institutional problems. In particular, it revealed that
the innovations relating to universality, flexibility, and centralization
that ILO officials had introduced during the organization’s first two
decades were ill-suited to a more diverse and more politicized
membership and to ambitious forays into controversial subjects at the
core of national sovereignty.
To the contrary, these pre-war
innovations—when applied in a markedly changed post-war
environment—created dysfunctional incentives and pathological
behaviors that impeded the organization’s effectiveness.
The changing composition and interests of workers’
organizations was an important factor in precipitating these negative
changes. As described above, national trade unions provided strong
support for the social justice mission espoused by the first generation
of ILO officials.190 As a member of the ILO and of domestic interests
groups, organized labor provided a key link between the organization
and the domestic politics of its member states. Trade unions lobbied
187. Maupain, Reflections on Myanmar, supra note 145, at 93 n.25.
188. Córdova, supra note 180, at 143.
189. Id. at 142–43.
190. See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text (discussing support of worker groups
for ILO Office during the organization’s first two decades).
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governments to ratify ILO conventions, to implement labor protections
in national laws and collective bargaining agreements, and to support
(or at least acquiesce in) the expansion of ILO officials’ authority. “To
be effective instruments of pressure within countries,” however, “trade
unions would have to be strong and independent of state control or
domination.”191
Maintaining the independence of organized labor presented
little problem when the ILO’s members were nearly all from
industrialized democracies. But it became increasingly difficult to
maintain with the inclusion of labor delegates from socialist and
developing countries. Challenges to the accreditation of “pseudodelegates” of worker organizations from the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe have been well documented,192 as have ILO officials’ efforts to
strengthen nascent trade unions in newly independent (and
democratically shaky) countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.193
Yet as national labor groups diversified, the workers’ representatives
at the ILO remained in “the hands of trade union functionaries who
head[ed] old, entrenched organizations representing, overwhelmingly,
democratic and industrialized national settings.”194 The result was a
disconnect between labor groups operating internationally and those
active in domestic politics, a divide that constricted a crucial pipeline
of support that ILO officials had cultivated during the organization’s
earlier decades.
1. Perverse Lawmaking Incentives
Beginning in the late 1940s, the ILO churned out a steady
stream of new conventions using the lawmaking procedures it had
adopted before the war.195 As the organization’s legislative output
increased, however, ILO officials noticed a disturbing and increasingly
common trend: many of these new treaties were sparsely ratified.196
191. Cox, Limited Monarchy, supra note 13, at 122.
192. Maupain, Reflections on Myanmar, supra note 145, at 90.
193. HAAS, supra note 13, at 192.
194. Id. at 201; see also id. at 199–202 (discussing the dominance that the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions exercised over other trade union groups in the ILO during
the 1950s and 1960s).
195. See Valticos, supra note 146, at 401 (stating that ILO adopted sixty-three conventions
and sixty-eight recommendations between 1944 and 1969).
196. See Boockmann, supra note 10, at 292; Cooney, supra note 9, at 376. A 2000 ILO study
found that ratification rates for different categories of conventions—such as labor
administration, working conditions, social security, and safety and health—ranged between
approximately 15% and 35% of ILO member states. Only “fundamental conventions,” including
human rights treaties, had significantly higher ratification rates—around 68% of member states.
ILO, Statistics on Ratification, supra note 10, graph 7.
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The ILO’s tripartite structure might predictably produce this result
where the membership adopted a treaty with strong backing from
employers and workers, but only limited support from governments.197
But the ILO adopted nearly all post-war conventions unanimously or
with supermajority governmental support.198
In addition, the
Constitution of 1946 obligated member states to convey newly-adopted
treaties to their respective parliaments for approval and to provide
compliance information for treaties that domestic lawmakers
ultimately chose to reject.199 These new obligations should have
increased the pressure on ILO members to ratify the treaties.
A rational choice framework that examines the conduct of
nation states alone cannot account for this paucity of treaty
ratifications. But by disaggregating states into their governmental
components, and by considering the independent interests of IO
officials, the perverse incentives for ILO treaty-making without treaty
implementation are revealed.
The different identity of representatives voting for treaties in
the ILO and those voting to make those treaties binding in domestic
law provides a partial explanation for the sparse number of
ratifications.
In the ILO, workers and employers have direct
participation rights; in national legislatures, they have only indirect
influence and must compete with other interest groups for legislators’
attentions. This distinction was especially prevalent in socialist and
developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s, many of which were
run by centralized governments that tightly controlled both domestic
labor groups and the treaty ratification process. Seen from this
perspective, the ILO Office’s desire to expand the number of member
states exacerbated the incentive for the ILO to adopt treaties that
garnered only meager ratifications.
The different identities of international and domestic
lawmakers cannot, however, explain why government delegates
supported treaties that they could readily anticipate would be rejected
at home. It was the structure of ILO lawmaking that permitted these
delegates to engage in a reverse two-level game,200 voting in favor of
197. Recall that each state nominates two government delegates, one employer delegate, and
one worker delegate to the ILO Conference, and that a two-thirds vote is required to adopt a
treaty. See supra note 3.
198. See TORSTEN LANDELIUS, WORKERS, EMPLOYERS AND GOVERNMENTS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF DELEGATIONS AND GROUPS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 1919–1964,
at 66–91 (1965).
199. 1946 ILO Constitution, supra note 174, arts. 19.5–6.
200. Cf. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,
42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988) (arguing that international politics shapes how national governments
pursue state interests and how those interests are in turn defined through domestic politics).
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treaties that their national parliaments were likely to reject (a
rejection made more likely by the ILO’s practice of barring unilateral
reservations).201 Aware that the decision to bind their respective
countries would take place at a later date and in a different forum,
government delegates could support the demands of other delegates
who favored the adoption of new conventions. In one version of this
game, government delegates traded their current votes in exchange
for promises of support for future initiatives they themselves favored.
In another, “logics of appropriateness” rather than “logics of
consequences”202 diminished resistance to new treaty-making and
allowed delegates “to lend their ears to arguments based solely on
principles, rationality and social justice.”203
A little-known provision of the amended ILO Constitution also
provided an incentive for ILO officials to encourage the adoption of
treaties that had little hope of widespread adherence. This provision
required member states to disclose the extent to which they had
complied with unratified conventions and recommendations and to
identify the obstacles to future ratification.204 Anecdotal evidence—
widely cited and praised in ILO studies of the period—indicated that
these reports had led many governments to modify their national laws
even when they had not ratified the treaties nor endorsed the
corresponding recommendations.205 As a result, the adoption of
conventions with only dim prospects of ratification would nevertheless
enhance the authority of the ILO Office by providing an additional
mechanism for ILO officials to influence state behavior.206

201. See supra Part III.C.2.
202. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 5–6 (1999).
203. Córdova, supra note 180, at 161.
204. 1946 ILO Constitution, supra note 174, art. 19.5(e). Other scholars, employing public
choice theory, have argued that international bureaucrats seek to expand their authority and
discretion through the creation or interpretation of international rules. See Paul B. Stephan,
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents, and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 681, 706, 718–19 (1996–97). As noted in the text, however, the ILO Constitution contains
unique features that exacerbate these public choice concerns.
205. E.A. Landy, The Influence of International Labour Standards: Possibilities and
Performance, 101 INT’L LAB. REV. 555, 563–64 (1970) [hereinafter Landy, Influence of
Standards]; see INT’L LAB. OFFICE, IMPACT OF CONVENTIONS, supra note 141, at 25–26 n.5 (citing
Landy article with approval).
206. See Córdova, supra note 180, at 161–62; Ignacio A. Donoso Rubio, Economic Limits on
International Regulation: A Case Study of ILO Standard-Setting, 24 QUEENS L.J. 189, 235
(1998); see also INT’L LAB. OFFICE, IMPACT OF CONVENTIONS, supra note 141, at 25–26 (stating
that reports on unratified conventions “have a dynamic effect in occasioning a re-examination by
governments, employers, and workers of the adequacy of national law and practice and
consideration by the ILO of the need for reinforcing its own activities”) (emphasis added).
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2. Normative Incoherence
Putting to one side the perverse incentives that favored the
adoption of treaties that were unlikely to be widely ratified, post-war
ILO lawmaking became increasingly convoluted and normatively
incoherent.
The treaties that comprised the rapidly expanding body of
international labor law were formally equal in status but highly
variable in content. A handful of treaties protected fundamental
rights, but most concerned narrow, technical subjects.207 Yet all
conventions were subject to identical monitoring requirements. This
absence of hierarchy created an uncoordinated “cafeteria approach” in
which states were free to “pick and choose” which treaties to ratify
without regard to their normative value.208 Grouping treaties together
in this haphazard way also cheapened the value of those few treaties
that ILO officials viewed as fundamental. As one commentator
pointedly remarked, “Such well-known and highly praised
instruments as those dealing with hours of work, abolition of forced
labor, freedom of association, and equality of opportunity and
treatment lose prominence when they are lumped in the same
category with those dealing with the certification of ships’ cooks or
paid educational leave.”209
A second coherence problem arose from the cumbersome rules
for revising treaties. As described above, the absence of amendment
procedures in the ILO Constitution required states to adopt “revising
conventions” to update international labor rules.210 These new
conventions supplemented, but did not replace, older treaties
addressing the same subject. Over time, families of closely related
treaties on the same topic came to occupy an increasingly large
component of international labor law.211
Many of the original
conventions in these families were outdated; some treaties even
conflicted with each other. But because the ILO had no power to
abrogate the earlier treaties, they remained in force for some member
207. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 247 (distinguishing between general and specific
conventions).
208. Francis Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat: The Real Potential of the 1998 ILO
Declaration for the Universal Protection of Workers’ Rights, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 439, 444 (2005)
[hereinafter Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat].
209. Córdova, supra note 180, at 151 (references to individual treaty numbers omitted).
210. See supra Part III.C.2.
211. Nicolas Valticos, The Future Prospects for International Labour Standards, 118 INT’L
LAB. REV. 679, 685 (1979) (stating that, as of 1979, 40 of 150 ILO conventions were revisions of
earlier conventions); Valticos, supra note 146, at 404 (stating that, as of 1969, 25 of 130 ILO
conventions were revisions of earlier conventions).
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states. This increased reporting and monitoring burdens for states
and ILO officials and freighted the corpus of international labor rules
with a sizable number of treaties that were nothing more than dead
weight.
A third and final coherence difficulty concerned the degree to
which conventions accommodated national differences through
flexibility clauses. Some governments and commentators argued that
pre-war and early post-war treaties were overly rigid and detailed,
making them relevant only to industrialized countries.212 The ILO
Office responded to these criticisms by including more flexibility
provisions in many (but not all) new conventions. The result was that
more recent treaties were often weaker than their predecessors.213 Yet
many of the states that had argued most vociferously for greater
flexibility rarely invoked these clauses when ratifying the new
treaties.214 This raised the question of just how seriously these
governments were taking their treaty commitments, an issue I discuss
in the next section.
3. Inadequate Monitoring Standards
Notwithstanding the perverse incentives and incoherence
problems described above, many ILO member states ratified at least a
few of the post-war conventions.215 For these treaties, detailed
empirical studies conducted during the 1960s concluded that the ILO
had a compliance record “of which any international agency can be
intensely proud.”216 These statements suggest that the monitoring
mechanisms developed by the first generation of ILO officials were
highly effective at influencing state behavior.
A more detailed analysis belies these sanguine views, however.
In particular, the standards that ILO officials used to assess member
states’ actions were incomplete or inaccurate in several important
respects. In addition, the findings generated in response to these

212. See Cooney, supra note 9, at 373 (commenting that ILO conventions and
recommendations set targets “that only the richest countries could realistically achieve”); Rubio,
supra note 206, at 211 (discussing inflexibility of ILO conventions).
213. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 246 (“Conventions found to be too demanding are often
revised downward by later conferences; upward revisions occur less often.”).
214. Servais, supra note 149, at 196–97.
215. Although ratification rates remained low for many treaties, the total number of
ratifications rose during the half-century following World War II. ILO, Statistics on Ratification,
supra note 10, at 2 & graph 1 (total ratifications of all ILO conventions increased from 908 in
1944, to 3527 in 1969, to 6255 in 1994).
216. HAAS, supra note 13, at 258; see also LANDY, THIRTY YEARS, supra note 13, at 198
(reaching a similar conclusion).
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assessments appeared in a highly stylized form that was difficult for
those outside the ILO to comprehend and that limited their ability to
influence state behavior.
The most simplistic evaluation measure was a simple head
count of treaty ratifications. This metric, however, ignored the fact
that some ratifications were “empty” or “bogus,” acts in which a
country “accept[ed] standards for which there was little or no basis in
national law and practice.”217 The ratification of maritime labor
conventions by landlocked and navy-less Luxembourg was a widely
cited—and widely derided—example.218 Empty ratifications of this
sort were useless, but they had few negative consequences. Far more
serious were cases in which “ratification was undertaken lightly
without seriously considering the implications for the economy.”
Governments in this situation sometimes “def[ied] the authority of the
Organization” by failing to submit reports or by refraining from
enacting the legislation necessary to implement the treaties.219
Confusion over how to evaluate state behavior made it difficult
for ILO officials to determine the extent of this recalcitrance. The
post-war growth in the number of treaties, of member states, and of
reporting obligations increased the burdens on the Committee of
Experts—the entity charged with reviewing state reports on ratified
labor conventions.220 One response to these increased pressures was
to analyze only the implementation of conventions (whether states
had adopted formal legislation to give effect to the treaties) rather
than examining the more challenging and time-consuming issues of
compliance (whether governments actually enforced that legislation or
otherwise adhered to the treaty) or effectiveness (whether the treaty

217. LANDY, THIRTY YEARS, supra note 13, at 83–84; see also Córdova, supra note 180, at
155–56 (discussing rise of “hasty and spurious forms of ratification”).
218. See LANDY, THIRTY YEARS, supra note 13, at 84–86; see also Córdova, supra note 180, at
156 (listing Luxembourg’s ratification of maritime conventions as an example of a bogus
ratification); Strang & Chang, supra note 3, at 243 & n.36 (characterizing as “implausible”
Luxembourg’s ability to implement maritime conventions).
219. HAAS, supra note 13, at 268.
220. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. The continuous output of conventions and
recommendations vastly enlarged the Committee’s workload. See HAAS, supra note 13, at 253
(discussing Committee’s roles and functions); see also id. at 257 (stating that Committee of
Experts reviewed government reports concerning more than 3,200 ratifications between 1927
and 1963). To address the backlog, the ILO increased the interval between the submission of
reports from annually to once every two years, and then once every four years for most
conventions. See Samson, supra note 155, at 570. In another time- and cost-saving measure, the
Committee began to publish only its most important “observations;” its remaining comments
were simply forwarded to governments for their review. See id.
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actually altered the behavior of governments and provided greater
legal protections for workers).221
The focus on implementation, however, provided an incomplete
picture of member state behavior. For example, a comprehensive
empirical study conducted in the early 1960s found that nearly 75% of
ILO conventions were fully implemented at the time states ratified
them.222 This statistic is impressive, but should not be confused with
a finding that the conventions actually improved domestic labor
standards. In some instances, treaty standards were so vague that
ratifying states could easily enact a “law that conformed fully to the
criteria set forth in the convention but that was at the same time
operationally meaningless.”223 Conventions of this sort had high
implementation rates but produced little improvement in national
labor practices.
In other instances, governments ratified only
conventions whose standards “their domestic politics and policies
ha[d] already met.”224 For these treaties, compliance was perfect, but
effectiveness was negligible, since the treaties merely “reflect[ed]
previously attained labor conditions.”225
ILO officials eventually recognized the need to review
compliance and effectiveness as well as implementation.226 Yet even
as the organization attempted to improve its assessment measures,
preexisting modes of ILO monitoring made it difficult to evaluate state
behavior accurately and objectively.
As noted above, ILO member states had been wary of creating
a Committee of Experts in the 1920s to review their compliance
221. See Cooney, supra note 9, at 377 (“[W]here a convention is . . . ratified, the [ILO]
monitoring system considers whether or not a country’s legal system complies with that
convention, and essentially stops there.”); WALTER GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION: AN AMERICAN VIEW 214–15 (1981) (noting resistance of ILO officials to “prob[ing]
more deeply into the actual implementation of legislation and its effect on social and economic
conditions” in ratifying states); LANDY, THIRTY YEARS, supra note 13, at 57 (noting that the
“primary emphasis” of supervision is on “the achievement of legislative conformity” with ILO
conventions).
222. Strang & Chang, supra note 3, at 242 (reporting that Landy’s study of ILO monitoring
between 1927 and 1963 found 73% full implementation); see LANDY, THIRTY YEARS, supra note
13, at 66 (reporting that, in 72% of ratifications during this period, the Committee of Experts
made no “observations” on states’ failure to comply).
223. GALENSON, supra note 221, at 210 (applying this example to the ILO convention
requiring the establishment of minimum wages “for all wage earners whose terms of
employment are such that coverage would be appropriate”) (internal quotations omitted).
224. Flanagan, supra note 11, at 35.
225. Id. at 29. This argument assumes that states did not improve their national labor
practices in anticipation of subsequently ratifying the ILO conventions.
226. Cf. Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat, supra note 208, at 442 (arguing that ILO
initiatives should be measured by whether “they make a verifiable contribution to the
advancement of the Organization’s objectives in the real world”).
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records. To reduce potential resistance, the Committee couched its
comments to governments in the form of “observations” rather than
“criticisms.”227 Over time, the observations evolved into a highly
stylized and understated language. Thus, for example, when the
Committee identified a state’s behavior “‘with concern’ or ‘with regret’,
those phrases [were] meant to be understood as a serious criticism of a
government’s failure to implement a convention.”228
The Committee’s circumspect approach was appropriate for an
early twentieth century international monitoring body seeking to
overcome resistance from governments. But it was a highly inefficient
way for a more mature IO to monitor treaty compliance.229 The
Committee’s exquisitely enigmatic condemnations of states may have
been intelligible to old ILO hands, but they were hardly
comprehensible to those outside the organization.230
The different compositions of worker representatives in the
ILO and in domestic labor markets exacerbated this lack of
transparency.231 The disconnect between these two groups—especially
in socialist and developing countries—limited the ability of ILO
officials to cultivate a constituency that could translate the
Committee’s opaque criticisms into politically salient language and
use them to pressure governments to improve their domestic labor
practices.232 The result was that the ILO’s monitoring system,
although older and more developed than those of most United Nations

227. HAAS, supra note 13, at 253.
228. Leary, supra note 122, at 598; see also Oliver Liang, Informational Dimensions of the
ILO’s Committee of Experts 3 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing
the “esoteric codex of linguistic signifiers” used by the Committee of Experts to indicate degrees
“of approval or disapproval”). The Committee diffused states’ criticism in another way: by
segregating the sections of its reports containing comments to governments from those
describing treaty ratifications and “cases of progress” (the Committee’s verbal notation for
improvements in response to its past criticisms). Weisband, supra note 8, at 651. This
separation made it extremely difficult to compare domestic labor standards between member
states and within a single state over time. See Liang, supra, at 5 (stating that the reports of the
Committee of Experts contain “informational limits” that make them “a difficult source for
quantitative indicators of facts on the ground”).
229. See Weisband, supra note 8, at 651 (noting that the working methods of the Committee
of Experts had the paradoxical effect of undermining the “logic of the ILO monitoring regime”).
230. Liang, supra note 228, at 3 (“The ILO publishes a maximum of 8,000 printed copies of
the [Committee of Expert’s] report, circulated mostly in a closed community of cognoscenti who
[are] familiar with the Committee’s purpose and language.”).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 190–194 (describing these differences).
232. Conversely, ILO conventions had their greatest impact in “pluralist democracies where
labor [was] politically organized but not politically dominant.” Strang & Chang, supra note 3, at
254. These were countries in which the interests of domestic labor groups were aligned with the
interests of organized labor unions that held the reigns of influence in the ILO. See HAAS, supra
note 13, at 448–49.
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treaty systems, attracted little interest from the “most dynamic social
movements, such as human rights and consumer organizations.”233
4. Theoretical Assessment
The post-war period provides additional evidence to evaluate
which theory of IO change best explains the ILO’s evolution. ILO
officials responded to the shock of the Second World War by
successfully pressing for a marked expansion of their pre-war
mandate. Although the Office failed in its bid to achieve preeminence
for the ILO in social and economic affairs, it succeeded in expanding
the organization’s autonomy and subject matter mandate and in
locking in those expansions by amending the ILO Constitution.
This outcome accords with the predictions of some rational
choice scholars, who assert that IO change is best explained by a
punctuated equilibrium model in which institutional evolution occurs
in response to infrequent but intense exogenous forces.234 It even
more closely tracks the claims of Barnett and Finnemore, who share
rational choice’s focus on exogenous shocks but who also argue
(contrary to rational choice scholars) that IO officials capitalize on
these “moments of rapid global change” to “facilitate their own
expansion and intervention in the affairs of states and nonstate
actors.”235 Conversely, these events cast doubt on neofunctionalism’s
prediction that the most consequential IO change is incremental,
continuous, and endogenously driven.
Having successfully managed the post-war transition, however,
ILO officials faced a different challenge: how to apply existing
lawmaking and monitoring functions to an expanded policy space, one
in which their core constituency—workers’ organizations—were no
longer as independent or as influential in domestic politics. The
improvements in lawmaking and monitoring that ILO officials had
achieved before the war—when the membership was small and
homogeneous and the ILO was viewed as a paragon for other IOs—
were ill suited to an organization whose members were more
numerous and diverse and which was forced to compete for
predominance with other IOs.

233. Virginia A. Leary, “Form Follows Function”: Formulations of International Labor
Standards—Treaties, Codes, Soft Law, Trade Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS,
supra note 11, at 179, 187.
234. See Koremenos et al., supra note 44, at 766–67 (discussing how to account for evolution
of institutions within a rational design framework); see also Streeck & Thelen, supra note 46, at
7–8 (reviewing literature).
235. BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 50, at 33, 162.
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In this new environment, the ILO Office’s campaign for
universality, flexibility, and centralization generated inefficient and
dysfunctional behaviors. A larger policy domain made it more difficult
to agree on prioritizing the problems to be regulated, resulting in
normative incoherence, inconsistent use of flexibility provisions, and
incentives for states to adopt treaties but not ratify them. And with
more members, more treaties, and more diverse standards, centralized
monitoring of state behavior became increasingly difficult.
These problematic outcomes resonate with historical
institutionalist accounts of organizational change that emphasize path
dependence. As the use of particular working methods to realize
specific goals becomes a habit, it is increasingly difficult to change
either the goals or the methods used to achieve them. Instead of
responding to new challenges with fresh approaches, IOs follow
preexisting rules that channel responses in familiar, time-worn
directions, ultimately producing dysfunctional outcomes.236
In
addition, competition with other organizations does not necessarily
improve performance, a point that historical institutionalist scholars
also emphasize.237 To the contrary, competition can lead organizations
to engage in behaviors that are inefficient or undesirable from a
functional perspective.238
IV. GLOBALIZATION AND THE RETURN OF INNOVATION TO THE ILO
The history of the ILO analyzed in the preceding sections of
this Article helps to explain why many scholars and commentators
perceive the ILO to be ineffective and weak. But this historical study
also reveals the now-forgotten period of innovation by the first
generation of ILO officials, who worked independently of states to
improve the effectiveness of the organization’s lawmaking and
monitoring functions. From a theoretical perspective, the ILO’s
history reveals that both exogenous forces (such as shifting state
demands and environmental changes) and endogenous forces (such as
the autonomous interests and working methods of officials and staff)
are important variables for explaining how IOs change during
different time periods. Theories of institutional change that consider
only one sort of change or another would not have predicted the
evolution of the world’s oldest extant multilateral organization.

236. See PIERSON, supra note 37, at 34–44.
237. Id. at 126–30.
238. See BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 50, at 37.
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This focus on multiple sources of change raises an important
and unresolved question: can IOs learn from past mistakes?239 Stated
another way, if the combined effect of exogenous and endogenous
forces produces inefficient procedures or policy failures, can IOs
reverse course and correct these errors? If so, when and how do they
diverge from path-dependent practices to redefine their goals and
improve their performance?
I address these questions in the sections that follow. I analyze
the current wave of innovation at the ILO—a period of institutional
evolution and learning from past errors that began in 1994 following
nearly half a century of stagnation. I begin by identifying the
catalysts for institutional change and then analyze the major reforms
to ILO lawmaking and monitoring. I conclude with a discussion of
how ILO officials are cultivating support from non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”) beyond the organization’s core constituency of
organized labor groups and national trade unions.
A. The Exogenous Catalysts for Change
By the mid-1990s, the ILO’s geopolitical and economic
environment had undergone another major transformation. The end
of the Cold War reduced East-West divisions within the ILO, and the
triumph of market-based economies that followed led both states and
business interests to emphasize policies that promoted deregulation,
competition, and free trade.240
Linked to these developments was a marked decline in the
influence of organized labor. As described above, the ILO Constitution
and the Declaration of Philadelphia adopted a corporatist model of
social regulation, one in which workers and employers established
formal associations to negotiate with each other and with
governments. For the first half-century after its founding, the ILO’s
tripartite membership rules mirrored the corporatist structure found
in most of its member states, in particular in industrialized
countries.241 During this “heyday of corporatism,” ILO worker and
employer delegates could “legitimately claim to speak for a substantial
239. Scholars who analyze domestic and international institutions disagree on the extent to
which learning is a factor in producing change. Compare PIERSON, supra note 37, at 38 (stating
that, in politics, “learning is very difficult [and] cannot be assumed to occur”), with BARNETT &
FINNEMORE, supra note 50, at 160–61 (positing that “learning from failure” results in expansions
of IO activities).
240. See HECTOR BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION: THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SYSTEM AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS 60–61
(1996); Alston, supra note 186, at 463–64.
241. Cox, Labor and Hegemony, supra note 4, at 409–10.
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portion of the ‘workforce’ or for ‘employers,’ as those terms were then
understood.”242
By the early 1990s, however, corporatism was in serious
decline. Industrial workplaces structured around unionized, full-time,
salaried employees with benefits and pensions were no longer the
norm, even in industrialized democracies.243 Informal, non-unionized,
part-time, and self-employed workers (an increasing percentage of
them women) were far more prevalent. And the eroding divisions
between home and work and between formerly segmented national
labor markets were engendering a global workforce that was both less
organized and more vulnerable.244
These shifts raised fundamental questions about the ILO’s
mission and the purpose of the labor standards it produces. With
respect to membership, the breakdown of corporatism challenged the
legitimacy of the ILO’s tripartite structure and the ability of
“delegates drawn from trade union federations [to] give an effective
institutional voice to the majority of the [non-unionized] workforce in
most countries.”245 The post-Cold War emphasis on deregulation and
competition also created the risk that member states would view
worker protections as a hindrance to economic development,
triggering anew the race to the bottom that the ILO’s founders had
feared.246
Following in the agenda-setting footsteps of his predecessors,
Director General Michel Hansenne used the occasion of the ILO’s
seventy-fifth anniversary in 1994 to emphasize the paradigm-shifting
nature of these events and the need to reshape the organization’s
future. In a report titled Defending Values, Promoting Change: Social
Justice in a Global Economy,247 the Director General considered how
to maintain the ILO’s relevance in the face of these “enormous” and
“unprecedented” challenges.248 In striking contrast to earlier shifts in
the organization’s environment, however, the Director General did not
242. Cooney, supra note 9, at 370.
243. See id. at 370–71. Indeed, as early as the 1970s, official ILO reports indicated that
workers covered by collective bargaining agreements comprised less than a tenth of the world’s
work force. See Cox, Labor and Hegemony, supra note 4, at 411.
244. See Cooney, supra note 9, at 365–66; Christine Haight Farley, Men May Work from Sun
to Sun, But Women’s Work is Never Done: International Law and the Regulation of Women’s
Work at Night, 4 CIRCLES: BUFF. WOMEN’S J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 44, 46–48 (1996).
245. Cooney, supra note 9, at 371.
246. See supra Part III.A (discussing the rational design of international labor standards).
247. INT’L LAB. OFFICE, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL TO THE 81ST SESSION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, DEFENDING VALUES, PROMOTING CHANGE: SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY—AN AGENDA FOR THE ILO (1994).
248. Id. at 29.
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seek to expand the ILO’s subject matter mandate. To the contrary, he
stressed the dangers of “trying to do too much, setting ourselves a
course of action out of all proportion with the resources and skills at
our disposal.”249
In addition to defining the new challenges facing the
organization, the report candidly admitted that the ILO’s past
problems were threatening the universality, flexibility, and
centralization goals that had animated the organization since its
founding. It highlighted the declining ratification rate for ILO treaties
and the “growing discrepancy between the attitude of certain
governments at the time a [treaty] is adopted . . . and the stance they
take when the same instrument comes up for ratification.”250 The
report also indicated that a larger and more diverse membership had
made the balance between universal and flexible labor standards
exceptionally difficult to achieve. And it pointedly stated that the ILO
had misdirected its past lawmaking efforts, producing a surfeit of
disjointed conventions and recommendations that were unduly
stringent or largely irrelevant to the problems of the late 20th century
workplace.251
B. Revising the Structure and Function of International Labor
Standards
Defending Values, Promoting Change set out a range of
proposals to address these deficiencies.252 These suggestions set the
tone for discussions among governments, workers, and employers over
how to restructure ILO lawmaking and monitoring. The membership,
assisted by the ILO Office, quickly adopted a series of major reforms
that included: (1) a campaign to ratify a core group of labor rights
treaties; (2) a declaration on fundamental labor rights applicable to all
member nations; (3) an unprecedented use of the ILO’s sanctioning
authority; (4) the discarding of outdated labor standards; and (5)
measures to reduce the pace and improve the quality of ILO
lawmaking. I analyze each of these reforms below, emphasizing how
ILO officials learned both from their past mistakes and from the
successful practices of other IOs to remedy the perverse incentives,

249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 44–45.
See Alston, supra note 186, at 464–65 (reviewing Director General’s proposals).

708

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:3:649

normative incoherence, and inadequate monitoring problems of earlier
years by narrowing and refocusing the organization’s authority.253
1. The Ratification Campaign for Fundamental Labor Conventions
One of the ILO membership’s first tasks was to create a
hierarchy of international labor standards with a small number of
conventions at its apex. Building on the references to human rights in
the Director General’s report, attention quickly coalesced around eight
labor rights treaties.
These conventions were labeled as
“fundamental” to denote their privileged place in the new normative
order.254 In 1995, the Director General launched an aggressive
campaign to promote universal ratification of these treaties by all ILO
members.
In each subsequent year, the Director General has
published a report on the progress made toward this goal and has
urged states that have not ratified all of the fundamental conventions
to do so or to identify specific obstacles to doing so.255
The ILO Office has judged the ratification campaign to be
“singularly successful.”256 As of November 2005, the campaign had
generated 468 new ratifications. Of the ILO’s 178 member states, 116
have now ratified all eight fundamental conventions. All together, the
Office has received 88% of the total possible ratifications for these

253. For a comprehensive review of all of the lawmaking and monitoring reforms adopted
during the last decade, see Int’l Lab. Office, Comm. on Legal Issues and Int’l Lab. Standards,
Improvements in the Standards-Related Activities of the ILO: A Progress Report, GB.292/LILS/7
at
1
(Mar.
2005),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm
/gb/docs/gb292/pdf/lils-7.pdf [hereinafter Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Progress Report].
254. The eight fundamental conventions are: the Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organize Convention, 1948, July 9, 1948, ILOLEX No. C87, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C087; Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining
Convention, 1949, July 1, 1949, ILOLEX No. C98, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/convde.pl?C098; the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, June 28, 1930, ILOLEX No. C29,
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C029; the Abolition of Forced Labour
Convention, 1957, June 25, 1957, ILOLEX No. C105, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/convde.pl?C105; the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951, June 29, 1951, ILOLEX No.
C100, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C100; the Discrimination
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958, June 25, 1958, ILOLEX No. C111, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C111; the Minimum Age Convention, 1973, June 26,
1973, ILOLEX No. C138, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C138; and the
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999, June 17, 1999, ILOLEX No. C182, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C182.
255. Int’l Lab. Office, Comm. on Legal Issues and Int’l Lab. Standards, Ratification and
Promotion of Fundamental ILO Conventions, GB.294/LILS/5 at 1 (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb294/pdf/lils-5.pdf [hereinafter Int’l
Lab. Office, Promotion of Fundamental Conventions].
256. Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Progress Report, supra note 253, at 1.
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eight treaties.257 These statistics reveal that the ratification campaign
has made substantial progress toward achieving the ILO’s long-held
objective of universality. But it has done so by narrowing the
organization’s focus to a core group of treaties that have the most
compelling normative claim to adherence by the entire ILO
membership.
2. The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
The ratification campaign seeks to achieve the ILO’s goal of
universality by accelerating the traditional international law practice
of voluntary treaty ratifications. Yet even as the campaign gathered
steam in the mid-1990s, ILO officials and workers’ representatives
recognized the need for a more ambitious approach—a mechanism to
apply fundamental labor standards to all ILO member states
regardless of whether they had ratified the treaties protecting those
standards.
To achieve this result, the ILO took a page from the book of the
newly created World Trade Organization (“WTO”). The agreement
establishing the WTO was a “single undertaking,” a grand bargain
that all states were required to accept as a condition of membership.258
Recognizing the advantages of this global package deal and the threat
of trade sanctions that held it together, governments, scholars, and
activists began to debate whether to incorporate new subjects into the
WTO, including labor rights.259
The issue came to a head at a 1996 WTO ministerial meeting.
The trade ministers acknowledged the relationship between free trade
and labor, but they rejected calls to enforce labor standards with WTO
sanctions. Instead, the ministers “propel[led] the issue back into the
ILO’s court by reasserting . . . the importance of the core rights
dimension of globalization and the leading role of the ILO in
managing that issue.”260 This acted as a catalyst for the organization
to return to first constitutional principles and adopt a new approach—

257. See Int’l Lab. Office, Promotion of Fundamental Conventions, supra note 255, at 1–2.
258. See Steinberg, supra note 40, at 359–67.
259. See Alston, supra note 186, at 466, 471, 480; Robert Howse, The World Trade
Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 134–35
(1999).
260. Brian A. Langille, Core Labour Rights—The True Story (Reply to Alston), 16 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 409, 421 (2005) [hereinafter Langille, Core Labour Rights].
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the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work.261
The Declaration is a succinct restatement of the four core labor
rights—freedom of association, the elimination of forced labor, the
abolition of child labor, and non-discrimination in employment—
protected in the eight fundamental conventions. It requires member
states “to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith[,]” the
“principles concerning the[se] fundamental rights.”262 Significantly,
these obligations emanate from the ILO Constitution itself, in
particular the clause that requires states to report on unratified
conventions.263 The Declaration thus applies to all ILO members
without regard to the treaties they have adopted or their level of
economic development. By anchoring the Declaration in “the very fact
of membership in the Organization,”264 ILO officials had found an
ingenious way to mimic the WTO’s single undertaking approach using
the ILO’s existing constitutional structure.
In addition to its normative commitments, the Declaration
creates a new monitoring procedure to review government and private
sector conduct. The ILO has given this “follow-up mechanism” a high
degree of institutional support and funding.265 The mechanism
features an annual performance review of states which have not yet
ratified all of the fundamental conventions and an annual “Global
Report” that addresses one of the rights in depth. “The aim of each
Global Report is to provide an overall picture of the trends and
evolution with respect to the right concerned both in countries which
have ratified the relevant conventions, and in those which have
not.”266
The creation of membership-wide obligations and monitoring
mechanisms has a partial precursor in the Committee on Freedom of
Association formed in the 1950s to review workers’ complaints
alleging violations of trade union rights.267 But the fanfare that
accompanied the Declaration’s adoption in 1998 suggests something
considerably more momentous, with many observers heralding the
recognition of universal principles for all members states as “nothing

261. Int’l Lab. Org., Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (June 1998),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/decl/declaration/text/tindex.htm (follow “text of the
declaration” hyperlink) [hereinafter Int’l Lab. Org., Declaration].
262. Id.
263. 1946 ILO Constitution, supra note 174, art. 19.5(e).
264. Int’l Lab. Org., Declaration, supra note 261.
265. Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat, supra note 208, at 444–45.
266. Id. at 445.
267. See Alston, supra note 186, at 479–80; see also supra text accompanying note 186.
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short of a revolution in legal terms”268 and a “‘constitutional moment’
in the life of the ILO.”269
Whether the Declaration is achieving these lofty goals is a
subject of lively debate. Early praise for the Declaration was effusive,
but more recent assessments are less sanguine. Participants have
criticized the follow-up mechanism as “limited by the ILO’s failure to
develop a politically potent process to debate and prioritize”
violations,270 and prominent scholars have challenged the
Declaration’s normative ambiguities, its potential to be co-opted by
powerful nations for unilateral ends, and its diversion of resources and
attention from traditional standard setting activities.271
Other
scholars and former ILO officials have responded with aggressive
defenses of the Declaration.272 Yet both sides in this debate appear to
agree that the Declaration’s efficacy will ultimately be judged by its
real-world effects, and on that score, it must be evaluated together
with other recent changes in ILO lawmaking and monitoring.
3. The Threat and Use of Sanctions Against Myanmar
The goal of both the ratification campaign and the Declaration
was to create, on paper at least, a common core of legal standards
applicable to the entire ILO membership. Promoting compliance with
these commitments presented a far more difficult task. The ink on the
Declaration’s pages was barely dry when the ILO faced its first major
compliance challenge—stopping the widespread use of forced labor in
Myanmar.
The Myanmar situation presented the ILO with a paradigmatic
case for sanctions. A 1998 Commission of Inquiry had documented the
use of forced labor in the country on a widespread scale, in clear and
flagrant violation of a fundamental labor rights treaty (the 1930
Forced Labor Convention, which Myanmar had ratified), as well as the
Declaration’s parallel ban on forced labor. Confronted with the

268. Francis Maupain, The Liberalization of International Trade and the Universal
Recognition of Workers’ Fundamental Rights: The New ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-up, in SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 35, 44 (Maria Gavouneli & L.A. Sicilianos, eds. 2001).
269. Alston, supra note 186, at 459 (noting but not endorsing this viewpoint).
270. Andrew J. Samet, Doha and Global Labor Standards: The Agenda Item That Wasn’t, 37
INT’L LAW. 753, 755 (2003). Samet is a former Deputy Under-Secretary of Labor for International
Affairs and U.S. representative to the ILO. Id. at 753.
271. See Alston, supra note 186, at 476–513 (outlining problems with the core labor
standards approach).
272. See Langille, Core Labour Rights, supra note 260, at 412–37; Maupain, Revitalization
Not Retreat, supra note 208, at 440–63.
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Commission’s findings, Myanmar’s military government was
recalcitrant and unrepentant. Its hostile response ruled out the softer
managerial approaches and shaming strategies that are the bread and
butter of ILO monitoring, leaving sanctions as the only remaining
option.273
Yet the imposition of sanctions raised delicate and unsettled
issues. The Constitution of 1919 expressly authorized “measures of an
economic character” in response to a state’s failure to implement a
Commission’s findings.274 But the organization never exercised its
power to impose trade sanctions, and the 1946 revision of the
constitution removed this language and substituted a more ambiguous
mandate for the ILO Conference to take “such action as it may deem
wise and expedient to secure compliance.”275 In practice, therefore,
trade sanctions had remained politically and legally out of bounds
since the ILO’s founding. The uncertain legality of sanctions under
the WTO’s free trade rules created an additional deterrent. Any WTO
member that imposed trade sanctions in response to a request from
the ILO might be forced to defend its actions before the WTO dispute
settlement system and could itself be subjected to trade penalties if
the sanctions were found to be WTO-incompatible.276
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, to remain idle in the face
of Myanmar’s open defiance risked landing “a fatal blow” to the ILO
monitoring system.277 In 2000, the organization responded to this
threat by adopting a resolution that invoked the constitution’s
compliance clause for the first time in the ILO’s history.278 The
resolution asked governments and other IOs to review their relations
with Myanmar and to assist in implementing the Commission’s
recommendations.279
This cautious, incremental approach was hardly surprising
given the unsettled political and legal terrain that the ILO was
traversing. But even this guarded first step produced measurable
results. Myanmar officials agreed to site visits from high level
officials and to a more permanent ILO presence in the country. They
273. See Maupain, Reflections on Myanmar, supra note 145, at 95–97.
274. 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 419.
275. 1946 ILO Constitution, supra note 174, art. 33.
276. See Maupain, Reflections on Myanmar, supra note 145, at 107–14 (discussing the legal
uncertainty of ILO-authorized trade sanctions against Myanmar).
277. Id. at 96.
278. Int’l Lab. Org., Resolution Concerning the Measures Recommended by the Governing
Body Under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution on the Subject of Myanmar, ILO Conf. 88th Sess.
(June 14, 2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc88/resolutions
.htm#I.
279. Id. ¶ 1(b).
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also began to consider specific domestic labor reforms.280 Far more
significantly, the 2000 compliance resolution facilitated the imposition
of trade sanctions by ILO member states. In the United States, for
example, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003281
specifically references the ILO resolution as a justification for a
blanket ban on imports from Myanmar282 until such time as the
President determines, after consultation with the ILO Director
General (and other entities), that the military government in
Myanmar “no longer systematically violates workers rights, including
the use of forced and child labor, and conscription of child-soldiers.”283
Unfortunately, the violation of labor rights in Myanmar
increased sharply in 2003, and by the end of 2005, the situation had
reached a critical stage. Myanmar has threatened to withdraw from
the ILO (although it has not filed a formal notice of withdrawal), and
ILO officials are making a final effort to resolve the situation before
considering whether to impose additional compliance measures,
including trade sanctions, at the summer 2006 meeting of the ILO
Conference.284 These events highlight the limited and imperfect tools
available to pressure rogue states to comply with international law.
But they also reveal that the ILO membership is now willing to use
those tools against such states in the pursuit of the organization’s
fundamental values.285
4. Pruning International Labor Law
The ratification campaign and the 1998 Declaration privileged
a small set of fundamental labor rights and sought to apply them to
all member states—including global pariahs such as Myanmar. But
the ILO also faced the opposite problem: how to weed out and discard
conventions and recommendations that had become moribund.
280. See Maupain, Reflections on Myanmar, supra note 145, at 99–105.
281. Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, 50 U.S.C. § 1701, Pub. L. 108–61, §§ 1 to
9 (2006).
282. Id. § 2(10).
283. Id. § 3(a)(3)(A). For a discussion of the sanctions adopted by the European Union, see
External Relations, Eur. Union, The EU’s Relations with Burma/Myanmar (Nov. 2005),
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/myanmar/intro/index.htm.
284. See Int’l Lab. Office, Conclusions Concerning Myanmar, GB.294/6/1 & GB.294/6/2 (Nov.
2005),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb294/pdf/myanmar-conc.pdf;
Int’l Lab. Office, Developments Concerning the Question of the Observance by the Government of
Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), GB.294/6/2 (Nov. 2005),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards /relm/gb/docs/gb294/pdf/gb-6-1.pdf.
285. See Maupain, Reflections on Myanmar, supra note 145, at 118 (characterizing the use of
sanctions against Myanmar as “a significant innovation” and a reflection of the ILO’s defense of
“international public (moral) order”).
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Although studies of outdated labor standards had been undertaken in
the past, the organization had taken little concrete action to
implement their recommendations. In the changed economic and
political landscape of the mid-1990s, however, the ILO membership
gave fresh attention to pruning international labor law’s dead wood.286
The process proceeded in stages. First, a new working group
analyzed and classified all ILO instruments.287 Second, the ILO Office
began to actively promote the ratification of treaties that the working
group had identified as up-to-date. Third, it advocated the removal of
outdated treaties from the ILO monitoring system. To achieve this
result, the Office urged states to denounce outmoded treaties and to
ratify their corresponding revising conventions. It also proposed an
amendment to the constitution288 authorizing the ILO Conference to
“abrogate” outmoded treaties still in force.289
Pending the
amendment’s adoption, the Conference would “withdraw” treaties no
longer in force and “shelve” moribund treaties that were operative in
name only.290
Taken together, these efforts have produced a major overhaul
of international labor standards. The working group identified 73 upto-date conventions and 76 up-to-date recommendations out of 185
conventions and 195 recommendations—a statistic revealing that

286. See Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Progress Report, supra note 253, at 2 (describing the process
for updating the ILO’s standards).
287. See, e.g., Working Party on Pol’y Regarding the Revision of Standards, Int’l Lab. Office,
Follow-Up to the Recommendations of the Working Party: Information Note on the Progress of
Work and Decisions Taken Regarding the Revision of Standards, GB.283/LILS/WP/PRS/1/2, at 1
(Mar.
2002),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb283/pdf/prs-1-2.pdf
[hereinafter Int’l Lab. Office, Information Note].
288. Int’l Lab. Office, Instrument for the Amendment of the Constitution of the International
Labour
Organisation,
1997,
Questions
and
Answers
(2005),
http://www.ilo.
org/public/english/bureau/leg/download/campaign2005.pdf (analyzing proposed amendment to
ILO Constitution that, if adopted, will authorize the ILO Conference, by a two-thirds vote, to
abrogate a convention “which appears . . . to have lost its purpose or that . . . no longer makes a
useful contribution to attaining the objectives” of the ILO); see also Int’l Lab. Office, Information
Note, supra note 287, at 14–15 & n.38 (describing powers conferred by the amendment and the
number of ratifications required before it can take effect).
289. “Abrogation” terminates “all the legal effects of a ratified Convention, meaning
reporting obligations as well as the obligation to implement the Convention.” Tim De Meyer, The
Ratification of International Labour Conventions in the Asian–Pacific Region: Up to the
Standard? 42 n.49 (Centre for ASEAN Studies Discussion Paper No. 16, 1998), available at
http://143.129.203.3/cas/PDF/CAS16.pdf.
290. “Withdrawal” has the same legal effect as abrogation, but is applied to ILO treaties that
are not in force because of a lack of ratifications or subsequent denunciations. “Shelving” renders
a treaty dormant and subjects it to only minimal review by the ILO’s monitoring mechanisms.
Int’l Lab. Office, Information Note, supra note 287, at 14, 15.
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more than 60% of ILO legal instruments were outdated.291 The ILO
Conference has since shelved or withdrawn twenty-nine obsolete
conventions and thirty-six recommendations and identified other
treaties as candidates for abrogation after the constitutional
amendment takes effect.292 To speed that result, in 2005 the Office
launched a campaign to encourage ratification of the amendment.293
Member states have also increased their unilateral
denunciation of moribund treaties. The ILO Office received more than
250 denunciations between 1996 and the middle of 2005, the large
majority of which occurred automatically upon the ratification of an
up-to-date revising convention.294 To further promote these treaties,
the Office has asked non-ratifying states to describe any impediments
that prevent or delay their ratification.295
5. Reducing the Pace and Improving the Quality of Lawmaking
Since the Director General’s 1994 report, the ILO membership
has also become more deliberative in its adoption of new treaties. The
Office now reviews all suggestions for conventions to determine
whether the proposed standards are relevant, coherent, and have
widespread support.296 This more rigorous screening process has
slowed the pace of lawmaking dramatically. “In the post-war ‘golden
era’ the average rate of standard production was 3.15 conventions and
2.94 recommendations per year. For the last 10 years this yearly
average has dropped to 1.1 and 1.3 respectively.”297

291. Comm. on Legal Issues & Int’l Lab. Standards, Int’l Lab. Office, Improvements in the
Standards-Related Activities of the ILO: Outlines of a Future Strategic Orientation for Standards
and for Implementing Standards-Related Policies and Procedures, at 3, GB.294/LILS/4 (Nov.
2005), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/ standards/relm/gb/docs/gb294/pdf/ lils-4.pdf [hereinafter
Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Improvements in Standards].
292. Int’l Lab. Office, Information Note, supra note 287, at 13; Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Progress
Report, supra note 253, at 4.
293. Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Improvements in Standards, supra note 291, at 2. Eighty member
states had ratified the amendment seven years after its adoption in 1997. Ratifications from 118
states are required for the amendment to enter into force. Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Progress Report,
supra 253, at 4 n.22.
294. A search performed using the advanced search web page of ILOLEX, in the category of
“ratifications by member states,” using the word “denounced,” for the years 1996 to 2005
inclusive, yielded 263 denunciations. ILOLEX advanced query form, http://www.
ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm. For a more detailed analysis of why states have denounced
ILO conventions, see Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 47, at 1596–99.
295. Int’l Lab. Office, Information Note, supra note 287, at 11.
296. Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Progress Report, supra note 253, at 5.
297. Langille, Core Labour Rights, supra note 260, at 425 (citing Breen Creighton, The
Future of Labour Law: Is There A Role for International Labour Standards?, in THE FUTURE OF
LABOUR LAW 253, 258 (C. Bernard et al. eds., 2004)).
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As the quantity of treaties has decreased, their quality has
increased. The ILO Office now emphasizes the need for consensus
building before beginning to draft any treaty texts.
These
deliberations have produced some important successes. One recentlyadopted treaty—the 1999 Convention on the Worst Forms of Child
Labor—is the most rapidly ratified agreement in ILO history.298
The Consolidated Maritime Labor Convention (“CMLC”),
adopted in early 2006, provides an even more striking example.299 The
CMLC creates an incentive for all actors in the maritime shipping
industry—flag states, port states, labor-supplying states, ship owners,
and seafarers—to comply with its provisions. It achieves this result
by adapting an integrated certificate and inspection system found in
widely-ratified maritime treaties adopted by another IO—the
International Maritime Organization.300 The CMLC also includes a
flexible blend of hard and soft law and an expedited amendment
procedure to facilitate changes to the treaty’s technical rules. Finally,
and perhaps most remarkably, ship owners and seafarers are both
strong supporters of the treaty.301 Their joint agreement has made it
possible for delegates to negotiate the CMLC in less than five years—a
rapid pace for a mega-treaty that will replace sixty-eight maritime
labor conventions and recommendations.302
298. Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Progress Report, supra note 253, at 6 (noting that convention
received 150 ratifications in six years). Other recently adopted treaties have been far less widely
adopted, although none of them is a fundamental convention. See ILOLEX: Database of
International Labour Standards, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm (indicating
that four of the most recently adopted treaties have received between four and eighteen
ratifications as of July 2005).
299. Int’l Lab. Office, Proposed Consolidated Maritime Labour Convention (Int’l Lab. Conf.,
94th (Maritime) Sess., Report I(1B), 2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/stand
ards/relm/ilc/ilc94/rep-i-1b.pdf. A former ILO official has described the CMLC as an “extremely
ambitious” and “revolutionary project.” Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat, supra note 208, at
441.
300. See Int’. Lab. Office, Adoption of an Instrument to Consolidate Maritime Labour
Standards 6–8 (Int’l Lab. Conf., 94th (Maritime) Sess., Report I(1A), 2006), http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc94/rep-i-1a.pdf; Int’l. Lab. Office, Consolidated Maritime
Labour Convention: Commentary to the Recommended Draft 2, 5, 11–12 (Preparatory Technical
Maritime Conference, Sept. 13–24, Report No. PTMC/04/2, 2004), http://www.ilo.org
/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc94/ptmc/pdf/cmlc-comment.pdf [hereinafter Int’l Lab. Office,
CMLC Commentary].
301. Int’l Lab. Office, CMLC Commentary, supra note 300, at 33 (reviewing elements that all
negotiating groups believed should be included in the CMLC); see High-Level Tripartite Working
Group on Maritime Labour Standards, Int’l Lab. Office, Final Report, at 16–17, 23–24
(TWGMLS/2001/10, Jan. 2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/
techmeet/twgmls01/twgmls-fr.pdf.
302. See Joint Maritime Commission, Int’l Lab. Office, Final Report, App. 2
(JMC/29/2001/14, Jan. 2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/
techmeet/jmc01/jmcfr.pdf. The Maritime Session of the International Labor Conference approved
the final text of the CMLC on February 23, 2006. See Dep’t of Communication, ILO, ILO Adopts

2006]

GLOBALIZATION AND INNOVATION IN THE ILO

717

A final change to ILO lawmaking is a recognition that new
treaties may not be an optimal way to achieve the organization’s
regulatory goals. The “plan of action for migrant workers,” adopted in
2004, exemplifies this view.303 This plan of action eschews treatymaking in favor of an “integrated approach” that includes the
promotion of existing conventions and recommendations, information
gathering, technical assistance, capacity building, and cooperation
with other IOs.304 The plan of action thus tackles the contentious
subject of transborder migration of workers as a whole and with
greater emphasis on monitoring than was possible under a system of
sparsely ratified treaties.305
C. Cultivating Partnerships with NGOs to Address New Workplace
Realities
The institutional reforms described in the previous sections go
a long way toward remedying the problems that plagued lawmaking
and monitoring during the ILO’s period of institutional stagnation.
They do not, however, address the declining importance of organized
labor groups that have long been the ILO’s core constituency. ILO
officials have recognized the limitations of the corporatist model to
address the changing realities of the 21st century workplace. As a
result, they have cultivated support from NGOs and advocacy groups
to extend the ILO’s regulatory reach to workers outside of formal labor
markets who are not represented by trade unions or industrial
organizations.
A 1999 report by the Director General, entitled Decent Work,
signaled this redefinition of the organization’s mission.306 The report
reemphasized the ILO’s commitment to core values, including the
Sweeping New Charter for Maritime Sector: New Convention Will Guarantee “Quality Shipping”
Worldwide (Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2006/7.htm.
303. Comm. on Migrant Workers, Int’l Lab. Conf., Report of the Committee on Migrant
Workers, at 60 (June 2004), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/
ilc92/pdf/pr-22.pdf.
304. Int’l Lab. Office, Date, Place and Agenda of the 92nd Session (2004) of the International
Labour Conference, at 31–32 (GB.283/2/1, Mar. 2002), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
standards/relm/gb/docs/gb283/pdf/gb-2-1.pdf.
305. See Comm. on Migrant Workers, Plan of Action, supra note 303, at 60–64. Prior to the
adoption of the plan of action, one commentator lamented that “the ILO instruments concerning
migrant workers seem to have been generally ignored by the international community” and that
ILO activity on migrant worker issues was “effectively dormant.” RYSZARD CHOLEWINSKI,
MIGRANT WORKERS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THEIR PROTECTION IN COUNTRIES OF
EMPLOYMENT 135–36 (1997).
306. Int’l Lab. Office, Report of the Director General to the 87th Session of the Int’l Labor
Conference: Decent Work (June 1999), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
relm/ilc/ilc87/rep-i.htm.
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workers’ rights in the 1998 Declaration and the eight fundamental
conventions. But it also marked a clear break with the past. The
reference to “work” rather than “labor” was deliberate. It reflected the
Director General’s desire for the ILO to regulate all types of workrelated activities, including those not involving employment contracts,
fixed wages, or unions. As the report explained:
Because of its origins, the ILO has paid most attention to the needs of wage workers—
the majority of them men—in formal enterprises. But this is only part of its mandate,
and only part of the world of work. Almost everyone works, but not everyone is
employed. . . . The ILO must be concerned with workers beyond the formal labor
market—with unregulated wage workers, the self-employed, and homeworkers.307

Reaching these informal workers presented a challenge for the
organization. The ILO’s tripartite structure privileges access by
organized labor and employer associations over other advocacy groups.
These associations have little incentive to represent the interests of
other types of workers.308 A key goal of the Decent Work agenda,
therefore, has been to identify how NGOs “other than trade unions
and employer associations can make a positive contribution to the
design and implementation of decent work policies.”309
As with other recent innovations, ILO officials learned from the
experiences of other IOs in reaching out to these NGOs. Following the
lead of “organizations like the World Bank, the OECD, and the
European Union,” the officials asked “what so-called ‘civil society’
[can] do for decent work policies.”310 The provisional answer appears
to be that NGOs can make significant contributions to ILO lawmaking
and monitoring.
Perhaps the most successful venture illustrating the ILO’s new
linkages with civil society has been the campaign against child labor
in Pakistan’s sporting goods industry. The campaign, launched in
1996 during a high-profile European soccer championship, dramatized
the plight of 7,000 children who hand-stitched soccer balls in the
Sialkot region of Pakistan.311 After the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (an ILO member) publicized the use of child labor
in the region, all of the relevant parties—the Sialkot Chamber of
307. Id. Informal work is especially prevalent in developing countries, accounting for nearly
60% of total employment in Latin America and 90% of new urban jobs in Africa. Id.
308. See Cooney, supra note 9, at 371 (stating that ILO worker delegates “do not share the
experiences of non-organized workers, and are faced with conflicts of interest” in representing
them).
309. Lucio Baccaro, Civil Society, NGOs, and Decent Work Policies: Sorting Out the Issues 1
(Decent Work Research Programme Discussion Paper No. DP/127/2001, Int’l Inst. Lab. Stud.,
2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp12701.pdf.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 23.
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Commerce and Industry, the ILO, UNICEF, Pakistani NGOs, the
Government of Pakistan, Save the Children, and the World Federation
of the Sporting Goods Industry—entered into an agreement to
eliminate child labor from soccer ball manufacturing in Sialkot.312
The agreement weaned the industry away from its past
practices by encouraging the voluntary transfer of production facilities
from villages and homes to registered stitching centers. ILO field
monitors randomly inspected the centers to check for compliance with
the agreement. In addition, the agreement funded new education
centers for children who no longer worked in the soccer industry.313
According to a 2001 assessment, the Sialkot program has been
remarkably successful. Although it has yet to eradicate child labor in
the region, more than 3,000 children no longer work in the soccer
industry and 6,400 children are attending over 200 education centers
set up by the agreement.314
The ILO is also incorporating NGOs into other facets of its
lawmaking and monitoring activities. Its International Program on
the Elimination of Child Labor is collaborating with international and
local civil society groups to reduce the number of children working in
agricultural industries in Africa and in the garment industry in
Bangladesh.315 NGOs representing workers in the informal economy
have become more active in lobbying at the ILO, influencing debates
among workers’ delegates and shaping the substantive policies they
advanced during a 2002 discussion of “Decent Work and the Informal
Economy.”316 Finally, in 2004, NGOs seeking greater legal protections
for migrant workers participated in ILO meetings in Geneva for the
first time.317 NGOs still lack the mechanisms of institutional voice
that employer and worker representatives enjoy as members of the
ILO.318 But their increasing participation reveals the benefits of
312. Bureau for Workers’ Activities, ILO, ILO Partnership to Eliminate Child Labour in the
Soccer Ball Industry in Pakistan (Feb. 14, 1997), http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav
/telearn/global/ilo/guide/ilosoc.htm.
313. Baccaro, supra note 309, at 24.
314. Id.
315. See Int’l Prog. on Elimination of Child Lab., IPEC Reflections on Current Strengths and
Weaknesses in the West Africa Cocoa/Commercial Agriculture Program to Combat Hazardous
and Exploitative Child Labour (WACAP) 4 (June 27, 2005), http://www.ilo.org/public
/english/standards/ipec/download/2005_07_wacap_en.pdf; Int’l Lab. Office & UNICEF,
Addressing Child Labour in the Bangladesh Garment Industry 7, 10, 16 (2004),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/publ/download/2001_syn_bgmea_en.pdf.
316. See Leah Vosko, “Decent Work”: The Shifting Role of the ILO and the Struggle for Global
Social Justice, 2 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 19, 24–25, 39–40 (2002).
317. Migrants Rights International, Migrant Workers and Advocates Address the ILO
Tripartite Committee (2004), http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/2078.html.
318. See Cooney, supra note 9, at 389–90.
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expanding the corporatist model to include a broader array of civil
society groups in efforts to promote the fundamental rights of workers.
V. CONCLUSION: THE ILO’S RELEVANCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS
The ILO is a creature of the fragile and temporary peace treaty
that ended World War I. It is the tangible embodiment of a gesture
that the victorious Allies made to organized labor groups in
industrializing democracies to stave off the greater evils of
communism. Born into the brief but heady period of interstate
cooperation which followed that first global military conflict, and
structured around a corporatist model of social relations that divided
societies into governments, trade unions and employers’ associations,
the ILO should not have outlived the demise of the League of Nations.
It survived through the skillful efforts of the Directors General, the
ILO Office, and the trade unions that supported them, weathering
financial and economic crises, another world war, polarizing EastWest conflicts, the struggles of decolonization, and the challenges of a
globalizing economy.
Not surprisingly, the ILO’s effectiveness in creating and
monitoring international labor standards has fluctuated over its
nearly ninety-year existence. The organization’s early decades were
among its most successful. The hazards of the industrial workplace
were plain for all to see, and a small and homogeneous membership
enabled the Directors General and their staffs to expand the ILO’s
lawmaking and monitoring authority without triggering a backlash
from states. The decades following World War II were a different
matter. The ILO adopted a capacious mandate for social and economic
change, extending its reach into uncharted and politically contested
terrain.
ILO officials continued to follow the lawmaking and
monitoring procedures of the pre-war years. But when applied in a
vastly altered geostrategic environment—one characterized by a
larger and more diverse membership and national trade unions with
limited independence and waning political influence—these
procedures created dysfunctional incentives that impeded the ILO’s
efficacy.
In the last decade, however, the organization has shifted
ground yet again. ILO officials have ushered in a period of innovation
and reform, narrowing the organization’s mandate to emphasize a core
group of fundamental labor rights. These rights, which bind all states
by virtue of their membership in the ILO, now serve as the
organization’s normative polestar. But they also perform a secondary
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function. They enable ILO officials to reorient the organization away
from its past focus on preventing a race to the bottom—a strategic
framing that views labor protections as detrimental to free trade and
foreign investment—and to emphasize instead the instrumental
benefits to all states of adhering to fundamental labor standards.319
As I explain below, this history of ILO lawmaking and
monitoring contains insights for international legal scholars and for
social scientists.
A. The ILO and Legal Innovation
For lawyers and legal scholars, this Article rediscovers the
ILO’s forgotten past and explains how the organization survived and
prospered when other IOs of the inter-war period failed. It reveals
how the first generation of ILO officials cultivated support from
national labor unions and exploited ambiguities in the ILO
Constitution to improve the efficacy of the organization’s lawmaking
and monitoring procedures in aid of the founders’ universality,
centralization, and flexibility goals.
The Article also explores the transformations of the ILO’s
present, in which a blend of treaties, soft law instruments, and
monitoring mechanisms are carefully vetted, hierarchically organized,
widely supported, and structured to promote real-world change.
These legal innovations are the result of ILO officials learning from
the lawmaking and monitoring experiences of other IOs and from the
mistakes of the ILO’s own past—most notably an overly ambitious
social justice agenda that produced a jumble of under-adopted and
normatively incoherent conventions and recommendations.
Taken together, this review of ILO lawmaking and monitoring
belies the conventional wisdom that the ILO is a feeble and ineffectual
IO whose activities merit little attention from legal scholars or
policymakers. As other IOs struggle to make international rules
relevant to real-world problems and to address increasing demands for
participation by NGOs and advocacy groups, the ILO’s many years of
experience in adapting to shifts in its political and economic
environment and in managing the competing demands of states and
non-state actors will provide invaluable insight and guidance.

319. See Int’l Lab. Office, 2005 Improvements in Standards, supra note 291, at 3–4
(emphasizing these instrumental benefits).
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B. The ILO and Assessing Theories of Change in International
Organizations
For social scientists—and in particular for international
relations scholars who examine how IOs change—a process-tracing
case study of the ILO provides an opportunity to assess the three
theories of institutional change analyzed in this Article.
This
assessment can best be made by using a counterfactual analysis that
reviews the hypotheses of rational choice, neofunctionalism, and
historical institutionalism and then compares those predictions to the
history of the ILO as it actually unfolded.320
Rational choice fares poorly under this counterfactual
analysis.321 Recall that the simplest rational choice models claim that
state preferences determine the forms and functions of international
cooperation at any given moment in time.322 Proceeding from this
premise, rational choice scholars would assert that the ILO’s changes
throughout its history accurately reflect the shifting preferences of its
member states. Yet it is highly unlikely that states would have
created a multilateral labor standards organization that includes
workers and employers as full fledged members at any period other
than immediately following World War I.
The reasons for this are twofold. First, the inclusion of
independent worker and employer associations as equal partners in
the ILO was a revolutionary break with the state-centric international
order of the early twentieth century.
This unique tripartite
membership structure reflected the founders’ endorsement of a
corporatist model of social relations and their desire to provide
workers with a meaningful alternative to revolution. Once these
social forces subsided, however, there was little reason for states to
confer IO membership upon non-state actors. Indeed, it would take
320. Comparing real-world events to hypothesized alternatives is a widely accepted method
of testing hypotheses in the social sciences. See, e.g., COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS
IN WORLD POLITICS: LOGICAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Philip E.
Tetlock & Aaron Belkin eds., 1996); James D. Fearon, Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in
Political Science, 43 WORLD POL. 169 (1991). This is so even if “an element of speculation and
uncertainty is inevitable in entering the counterfactual realm.” Mark W. Zacher, Multilateral
Organizations and the Institution of Multilateralism: The Development of Regimes for
Nonterrestrial Spaces, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN
INSTITUTIONAL FORM 399, 401 (John G. Ruggie ed., 1993).
321. Rational choice has more traction in explaining the structures and functions of the 1919
ILO Constitution. See supra Part III.A. Because this theory does not take into account the
founders’ political concerns as well as their functional goals, however, it fails to explain why the
founders’ functional design choices are only partially and imperfectly embodied in the
constitution. See supra Part III.B.
322. See supra Part II.A.
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another half a century before states would again seriously consider
allowing civil society groups to participate in IOs, to say nothing of
granting them equal membership rights.
A second historical fact casting doubt on the predictions of
rational choice is the persistence of a freestanding, subject-specific
labor organization. As this Article has shown, labor standards are
closely related to trade and investment, economic development, and
human rights. This affinity creates powerful logical and functional
arguments for linking some or all of these issues together in the same
IO. If, for example, states had first regulated international labor
standards at the end of World War II, they would have almost
certainly included those standards in the newly-created United
Nations Economic and Social Council. (Even with the ILO in
existence, states invested the Council with a limited mandate to
address labor rights.) Similarly, if the ILO had not existed at the end
of the 20th century, states could logically have paired labor issues with
free trade, incorporating core labor rights into the WTO’s single
undertaking. Or they might have eschewed labor multilateralism
altogether, leaving powerful countries like the United States to
include labor standards in their bilateral trade and investment
agreements with developing countries.
Many variations are plausible. The essential point is that the
allocation of interrelated subjects among different institutions and
treaties is contingent on politics and history. If politics and history
change but the initial allocation of subjects does not, an explanation
other than rational choice is needed to account for its persistence.
The foregoing analysis strongly suggests that the ILO has
survived not because it has faithfully reflected state interests or a
rational distribution of labor-related subjects, but rather that it has
persisted notwithstanding changes in those interests and subjects. To
be sure, this conclusion does not disprove more sophisticated versions
of rational choice theory, which predict that change in IOs occurs in
response to infrequent, intense shifts in their external environment
which lead states to redesign the organization or to shift cooperation
to a rival IO. However, a closer examination of the ILO’s history
refutes these hypotheses as well.
Major exogenous events such as the Great Depression, World
War II, the Cold War, and a globalizing economy triggered reactions
within the organization. But, contrary to rational choice predictions,
ILO officials, not member states, were the principal proponents of
change. They framed the organization’s responses to these events in
the form of new treaties, a constitutional amendment, and expanded
monitoring mechanisms. Even more striking is the paucity of
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evidence of states attempting to thwart or undo changes that
enhanced the authority of ILO officials.323 Far from consciously
redesigning the ILO to check these new powers, member states largely
acquiesced in their incremental expansion.
These unchecked advances in lawmaking and monitoring
suggest that neofunctionalism more accurately predicts the ILO’s
evolution and survival. Yet this theory’s hypotheses, too, ultimately
come up short. Neofunctionalism asserts that expansions of IO
authority result from endogenous and incremental changes sought by
domestic interest groups, who recognize the benefits of IOs for
achieving their goals. Neofunctionalist theory predicts that these
groups will forge alliances with IO officials and work to enhance the
authority of those officials. As support for IOs from domestic interest
groups grows, cooperation takes on a self-reinforcing character,
spilling over into areas that are logically and functionally related to
the organization’s initial mandate. Ultimately, neofunctionalism
expects this process to shift loyalties from states to IOs.324
The history of the ILO does not bear out these claims.
Alliances between ILO officials and national trade unions were, as
neofunctionalism predicts, critical to the expansion of lawmaking and
monitoring activities during the organization’s first two decades. But
these linkages weakened rather than strengthened after World War
II. With the inclusion of socialist and developing countries, ILO
officials could no longer count on the support of autonomous trade
unions in all member states. Yet international confederations of trade
unions continued to dominate worker delegations at the ILO. The
organization’s links to domestic labor groups atrophied still further
with the decline of unions in industrial democracies that began in the
1970s. These events weakened a crucial source of political support for
ILO officials, a weakness only recently being redressed by the
cultivation of contacts with a broader array of labor rights NGOs. Yet
these new connections are occurring in an IO that has contracted, not
expanded, its subject matter mandate, contradicting a key hypothesis
of neofunctionalism.
In contrast to rational choice and neofunctionalism, the basic
premise of historical institutionalism—that history matters—finds
ample support in this Article’s study of the ILO. Stated more
concretely, historical institutionalists claim that the origin and
323. Notably, the only meaningful rejoinder to the ILO’s overreaching—the withdrawal of
the United States between 1977 and 1980—was not a response to incremental expansions of ILO
lawmaking and monitoring, but rather an effort to check the foray by other member states into
unrelated geopolitical issues. See IMBER, supra note 125, at 64–66.
324. See supra Part II.B.
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evolution of IOs are important predictors of their current functions
and the constraints they impose on member states.325 This is certainly
true of the ILO, which still bears the historical imprint of the unique
social and political forces that animated its birth and shaped its
constitutional structure.
Historical institutionalism is less successful at predicting the
specific sources of change in the ILO. The organization evolved in
response to both endogenous and exogenous factors, a combination
that dovetails with some historical institutionalist accounts. But
these accounts are, as I explain below, less adept at specifying a more
precise causal relationship between these two factors.
First, the distinct phases of the ILO’s history illustrate
important variations in the comparative pressure of exogenous and
endogenous forces during different phases of an IO’s life cycle. Periods
of major economic or political instability created opportunities to
overhaul the organization’s mandate and functions. Yet the ILO did
not always capitalize on these critical junctures, with the result that
more consequential and longer-lasting changes occurred during
periods of relative quiescence. As historical institutionalists predict,
path dependence is an important factor here.326 The effects of early,
endogenous changes (such as the lawmaking and monitoring
improvements implemented by ILO officials in the 1920s and 1930s)
persisted for decades, influencing behavior of the ILO membership
long after the effects of exogenously-driven changes had dissipated.
Second, the presence or absence of competitor IOs was a key
factor in fomenting change within the ILO. For more than two
decades after its founding, the ILO was the world’s most successful
multilateral organization.
In this unfettered environment, ILO
officials could expand the organization’s lawmaking and monitoring
powers with little risk that states would shift their support to a
competing organization. The creation of the United Nations ended
this period of institutional hegemony and increased the ILO’s
insecurity.327 ILO officials reacted by pressing for an expansion of the
organization’s subject matter mandate—an expansion that its
preexisting lawmaking and monitoring functions were ultimately illequipped to handle.
Third, the chronicle of the ILO’s survival suggests that the
trajectory of IO evolution is not unidirectional, leading inexorably to
325. See supra Part II.C.
326. See PIERSON, supra note 37, at 17–53.
327. See Barnett & Coleman, supra note 31, at 599–600 (identifying “organizational
insecurity” as one of two explanatory variables that affect how IOs respond to pressures in their
external environments).
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expansion (as neofunctionalists claim) or, conversely, to stagnation
and decline (as some historical institutionalist accounts suggest).
Moreover, when shifts in direction do occur, they do not follow the
predictions of any one theoretical paradigm. For example, the
expansion of the ILO’s authority did not trigger a backlash from
states—a claim frequently made by rational choice scholars. Nor,
when states reacted, did they efficiently recalibrate design features to
restore their control over the organization or achieve other functional
goals.
To the contrary, the incremental competence-enhancing
changes by ILO officials and staff were difficult to reverse,
particularly where they resonated with the organization’s
foundational principles.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the ILO has learned
from other IOs and from its own past the benefits of focusing on core
values. Over the last decade, the ILO has adopted a strategy of
retrenchment, narrowing its mandate to emphasize compliance with a
limited group of fundamental labor rights. This strategy casts doubt
on accounts of institutions that emphasize their inherently
expansionist tendencies. It also belies the recent claim that “IOs
appear to be steadily expanding their mandates in a convergent
direction” by becoming “increasingly involved in the domestic affairs of
states.”328
The rich history of the ILO explored in this Article poses new
theoretical challenges for scholars who study how and why
international organizations change.
These challenges include
determining the factors that define the “strategic space” within which
IO officials and staff can act autonomously;329 identifying when
putative reforms produce more effective institutions as opposed to
creating the appearance of efficiency without producing tangible
results; and specifying the conditions under which IO officials choose
to constrict their authority rather than expand it.

328. BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 50, at 164; see Edward T. Swaine, The
Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1605–07 (2004)
(reviewing scholarship claiming that international organizations exhibit “mission creep” and
seek to expand their mandates).
329. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints, 98 AMER. J. INT’L L. 247, 248–49 (2004).

